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The Age of Innocence: The First 25
Years of The National Collegiate
Athletic Association, 1906 to 1931
W. Burlette Carter*
In 2006, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”),
the most powerful body in intercollegiate athletics, celebrates its 100th
anniversary. In this article, the author undertakes to survey the
NCAA’s first twenty five years,1 offering a revealing snapshot of the
beginning of intercollegiate athletics in the United States. As with the
author’s prior articles on this subject, this article continues the unique
approach of using the proceedings of the NCAA and contemporaneous
media articles to make its case. In so doing, the article challenges
commonly held assumptions about the origins of present intercollegiate
*
Professor of Law, the George Washington University Law School, J.D. Harvard
Law School. This article is part of a series on the NCAA. See also W. Burlette Carter,
Student Athlete Welfare in a Restructured NCAA, 2 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 1 (2000); W.
Burlette Carter, Responding to the Perversion of In Loco Parentis: Using a Nonprofit
Organization to Support Student-Athletes, 35 IND. L. REV. 851 (2002). I thank the NCAA
for long ago allowing me access to its library; Germaine Leahy of the George Washington
University Library staff for her assistance and the editors of the Vanderbilt Journal of
Entertainment and Technology Law for their superb assistance in getting this article to
press.
1.
Very few other detailed histories of the NCAA exist. The significant ones are
both commemorative. The NCAA commissioned journalist Jack Falla to write its official
Seventy-fifth Anniversary history. JACK FALLA, NCAA, THE VOICE OF COLLEGE SPORTS: A
DIAMOND ANNIVERSARY HISTORY, 1906-1981 (1981). It turned to the President of the
University of Nevada, Reno, Joe Crowley, for its centennial version. JOE CROWLEY, IN THE
ARENA: THE NCAA'S FIRST CENTURY (2006). For an abbreviated NCAA view see Kay
Hawes, Its Object Shall Be Regulation and Supervision: NCAA Born from Need to Bridge
Football and Higher Education, NCAA NEWS, Nov. 8, 1999, available at
http://www.ncaa.org/news/1999/19991108/active/3623n27.html.
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The year 2006 marks the one hundredth anniversary of the
founding of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”).2
At this milestone the NCAA occupies a unique place in American
educational history and in American law. Held up as a historical
champion of amateurism in college sports, it has enjoyed the
confidence of both legislators and the courts, and may well be the most
powerful nongovernmental regulator in America. Commanding a
budget that approaches 500 million dollars,3 its power reaches not
only the 1,000-plus educational institutions that are its members but
also anyone who does business with them, not to mention hundreds of
thousands of current and prospective participants in intercollegiate
athletics. One hundred years has brought a great many changes. In
important ways, the modern NCAA is quite different from the NCAA
that its founders conceptualized.
This article investigates the first quarter of a century of the
NCAA’s history, using as its primary sources the NCAA’s annual
convention proceedings for that period and contemporaneously-written
media reports. The goal is to identify the key debates that shaped the
NCAA, to consider to what extent the assumptions, principles and
ideals of the early NCAA are still reflected in the modern organization
or have been abandoned in favor of new ones, to surmise what might
have happened had the NCAA emerged from those debates to take
different directions in shaping athletics policy than the paths it did
indeed take, and to reflect upon how this information should affect the
direction of intercollegiate athletics regulation in a modern era.
The author concludes that despite courts’ widespread
adherence to the notion that intercollegiate athletics continues an
American tradition of amateurism, an accurate historical perspective
requires us to accept that many modern-day intercollegiate athletic
2.
As discussed in greater detail infra notes 19-20, in December 1905, at the
behest of the Chancellor of New York University, a group of schools gathered in New York
to shape a preliminary constitution for the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the
United States which later became the NCAA. Intercollegiate Athletic Ass’n of the United
States, Palmer E. Pierce, The International Athletic Association of the United States: Its
Origin, Growth and Function, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND ANNUAL CONVENTION OF
THE INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N OF THE UNITED STATES 27, 28 (1907) [hereinafter
1907 PROC.]. Schools joined the body throughout 1906 by individually ratifying the
constitution. Id. The NCAA’s first official convention was in December 1906. Id.
3.
See NCAA, The National Collegiate Athletic Association Revised Budget for
Fiscal Year Ended August 31, 2005 (Nov. 7, 2005), http://www1.ncaa.org/finance
/2005-06_budget.pdf.
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programs lack key components of traditional amateurism. If courts
are to continue to recognize amateurism as a value in cases
challenging the NCAA and intercollegiate athletics policies; they must
define what amateurism means in a modern era, identifying its
essentials. To begin this process of redefining amateurism, the author
urges a disentanglement of the terms “amateurism,” “education,” and
“intercollegiate athletics,” arguing that these terms have become
muddled over the years. Using a new amateurism yardstick, courts
should place an amateurism thumb on the scale for intercollegiate
athletics programs only if the program is infused with amateurism
and only if challenged policies are also consistent with amateurism.
The NCAA and member schools can help in this process of shaping a
new amateurism; they cannot be its sole architects.
Part I of this article discusses the NCAA’s founding. Part II
discusses the evolution of the NCAA within the first twenty-five years,
by focusing on the key issues that confronted the founders. Part III
discusses the role World War I played in the growth of intercollegiate
athletics. Part IV discusses how the early NCAA dealt with the roles
of minorities and women in sport. Part V discusses the emergence of
professional leagues, particularly in football, and the NCAA’s response
to the professionals as a perceived threat. Part VI discusses the
NCAA’s historical relationship with the media. Part VII discusses
NCAA contributions to rules promulgation, championships and the
formation of a national Olympic association. Part VIII discusses
cracks in the NCAA coalition that ultimately led to its membership
splitting into three Divisions differentiated by size of program and
amateurism philosophy. Finally, Part IX asks what the NCAA’s
founders would say if they could see that organization now and how
lessons learned from this history should affect modern regulation of
amateur athletics and of the NCAA.
I.

IN THE BEGINNING

A. Football—and “False College Colors”: The Founding of the NCAA
In the fall of 1905, nineteen year old William Moore, a Union
College student and a resident of New York State was fatally injured
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in a game between Union and New York University (“NYU”).4 One
newspaper reported the circumstances of his death in this way:
Moore was injured about the middle of the game, when the contest was closest
and the play fiercest. Although the accident temporarily delayed the game, as soon
as the unfortunate half-back had been carried off the field, he was practically
forgotten and the game proceeded to the end.
In an attempt to get through the New York center Moore went at the line head
first like a catapult. This play was his last. No one saw what Moore’s head struck
but he dropped limply to one side of the scrimmage and the ball fell from his
hands. All efforts to revive him failed. The spectators became so excited that they
poured on the gridiron by the hundreds, until the police drove them back. Moore
died within six hours without regaining consciousness.5

Moore was one of eighteen young men who died while playing
football in the 1905 season. More than 150 other young men were
injured in service to the game that year. Some branded it a brutal
sport and called for its demise.6 By November 1905, Columbia
University abandoned the game altogether.7
Well before Columbia’s action and young Moore’s death,
President Theodore Roosevelt was watching the football controversy
from the White House.8 An avid sportsman, Roosevelt strongly felt
the game had to be saved.9 In October of 1905, he called the athletic
directors of the football programs at Harvard, Yale and Princeton to
the White House to discuss what needed to be done.10 For Roosevelt,
the answer seemed to lie in changing the rules of the game to
discourage hazardous play.11 Indeed, the 1905 version of football was
an amalgam of rugby and soccer, with plenty of extra roughness
4.
Football Player Killed; William Moore, of Union College, Dies From Blow on
Head, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1905.
5.
Id.
6.
See Deaths from Football Playing; Forty-Five Athletes Have Been Victims in the
Past Five Years, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1905; see also Cartoon, Theodore Roosevelt
Conference with Football Athletes, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1905; Reform in Football: Reform
Must Come or the Game is Doomed, it is Declared, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1905; Few Injuries
from Football, No Deaths Resulted from Southern Gridiron Season, CONST. (Atlanta), Dec.
6, 1905, at 1 (claiming South had no deaths and conducted “clean athletics; comparing
situation to that of eastern states and predicting new rules would come in 1906); Ten
Football Deaths is the Record to Date, NEWARK DAILY ADVOC., Nov. 18, 1905 (noting record
number of deaths, predicting more and discussing deaths in prior seasons).
7.
Columbia Takes Drastic Action; Decides to Abandon Football, POST-STANDARD
(Syracuse, N.Y.), Nov. 29, 1905, at 3.
8.
See Ronald A. Smith, Harvard and Columbia and a Reconsideration of the
Football Crisis of 1905-06, 8 J. OF SPORTS HIST. 5, 10-11 (Winter 1981).
9.
Id. at 10.
10.
Id. at 11.
11.
See id. at 10-11.
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thrown in.12 Players could link arms together or stay in close
formations to obtain extra force or leverage against opponents.13
Modern protections such as helmets and shoulder pads were unheard
of.14
Meeting the President at the White House that October were
Walter Camp and John Owsley of Yale, J.B. Fine and A.R.
Hillenbrand of Princeton, and Edward H. Nichols and William T. Reid
Jr. of Harvard.15 After the meeting, Camp, the General Athletics
Advisor at Yale, and a later football legend, issued a statement signed
by the athletic leaders of the involved schools. It read as follows:
In a meeting with the President of the United States it was agreed that we
consider an honorable obligation exists to carry out in letter and in spirit the rules
of the game of football relating to roughness, holding and foul play and the active
coaches of our universities being present with us pledged themselves to so regard it
and to do their utmost to carry out that obligation.16

Out of the Roosevelt meeting emerged what became known as
the “American Football Rules Committee” (“FRC”). In December of
1905, Harvard, Yale and Princeton joined the U.S. Naval Academy,
Cornell University, University of Chicago and the University of
Pennsylvania in Philadelphia for the FRC’s first meeting. That group
began to promulgate football rules to be used nationally by those
playing the game. By January of 1906, Harvard declared that if
football’s rules were not changed further, it too would abandon the
game.17
For his part, President Roosevelt continued to keep his eye on
things as matters progressed. Shortly after his October meeting, he
attended the Harvard/Yale game, reportedly “to see whether his
suggestions on the game have been put in place.”18

12.
13.
14.

Hawes, supra note 1.
Id.
For a description of dangerous aspects of early football play, see Hawes, supra

note 1.
15.
See Smith, supra note 8, at 11 n.38.
16.
Play by Rules, Request Made by Roosevelt; Walter Camp Issues Statement as to
Conference at White House, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 1905, at 1. For more on the Roosevelt
Meeting and football controversy see generally Smith, supra note 8.
17.
Harvard Demands Reform; If Rules Are Not Changed, There Will Be No
Football Games, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 1906, at 3 (noting the position of Chairman of
Harvard’s Athletic Committee that if Football Rules Committee does not make radical
changes Harvard will go it alone and noting that Harvard suffered 145 injuries serious
enough to cause players to miss a game).
18.
Mr. Roosevelt Applies for Seats at the Harvard-Yale Game, WASH. POST, Nov.
10, 1905.
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Notably, the list of invitees to the White House and to the
December Pennsylvania meeting was a limited one. But William
Moore’s death barely a month after the President’s call for reform,
spurred NYU’s Chancellor, H.M. McCracken to action.
First,
McCracken tried to convince NYU’s president to call for changes in
football. Unsuccessful, McCracken made his own call for educational
institutions, including the Roosevelt group, to meet in New York City
at a National Football Conference to discuss changes in the game. 19
Sixty-eight institutions joined McCracken for that New York football
conference in December of 1905.20 There, they agreed to form the
Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States (“IAAUS”).21
In 1910, seeking a more distinctive description that indicated their
nationwide aspirations, that group changed its name to the National
Collegiate Athletic Association or “NCAA.”22
One might wonder why two different groups of educational
institutions, both concerned about the brutality of football, would meet
separately in the same month, or indeed, why Roosevelt did not invite
an even larger number of schools to meet with him. One possibility is
that Roosevelt, a Harvard alumnus, and the members of the Football
Rules Committee were simply being elitist. There is no question that
the schools Roosevelt targeted set both educational trends and the
national tone of college football. But a close look also reveals that the
two groups’ founders had important differences in conceptions of how
to cure the problem. Roosevelt and the schools he contacted dearly
wished to save the game. NYU’s Chancellor McCracken, on the other

19.
Three years later, in 1908, in addressing the very group he helped to found,
Chancellor McCracken would reflect upon his actions in those days:
Little credit can be given me for taking the responsibility for the call of the first
convention. The fatal accident upon the football field at University Heights
coming when the agitation for the reform of football was at its height, constituted
a loud call. After I had in vain urged a university president, who was my senior,
to act, it was made an imperative duty upon me to do what I could. Hence the
call in 1905.
Intercollegiate Athletic Ass’n of the United States, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD ANNUAL
CONVENTION OF THE INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N OF THE UNITED STATES 6 (1909)
[hereinafter 1908 PROC].
20.
Palmer E. Pierce, The International Athletic Association of the United States:
Its Origin, Growth and Function, in 1907 PROC., supra note 2, at 28 (reflecting on the
history of the IAAUS).
21.
Id.
22.
See W. Burlette Carter, Responding to the Perversion of In Loco Parentis: Using
a Nonprofit Organization to Support Student-Athletes, 35 IND. L. REV. 851, 874 n.100
(2002) [hereinafter Carter, In Loco Parentis]. For ease of reference, henceforth in the text,
the IAAUS will be referred to as the NCAA.
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hand, along with the president of Union College, which William Moore
had attended, felt strongly that the game should end. Of football,
McCracken apparently felt that “its attendant evils [are] practically
impossible of correction.” 23 Indeed, it was apparently common
knowledge among those who convened in New York in 1905 that the
original intent of that meeting was to seek the abolishment of
football.24
There seemed to be one more difference between McCracken’s
group and the smaller Football Rules Committee as the 1905 year
ended. By the end of their conference, the McCracken group had
extended its agenda to “the reform not only of football but of
intercollegiate athletics as a whole.”25 The agenda was dramatic
because, in these days, most intercollegiate programs were controlled
by undergraduate students.26
In 1907, Captain Palmer Pierce of West Point spoke of a
concern that students were parading in “false college colors,” i.e., not
adhering to the tenets of amateurism as a key animus for the
formation of a new body:
The year 1905 was memorable in the athletic world on account of a campaign
waged against the various abuses that had grown up in college athletics.
Newspapers were filled with articles reflecting, not only on the methods of play in
various sports, but also on the amateur status of many members of prominent
college teams. Even the magazines took part in the discussion, and the need of
change and reform in our supposedly amateur college athletics was emphasized by
citing specific examples of proselyting, of prominent college players not really
amateurs, and of the various covert forms of payment to certain men for their
athletic services. It was related in detail under what disguise money returns were
given. For instance, one prominent player was said to have derived hundreds of
dollars from the privilege of furnishing programs for games; another received the
profit from a special brand of cigarettes named after him; a third was the
ostensible head of an eating club, while still others were in the private employ of
rich college graduates.

23.
Opinions on Football; Only Two Prominent College Presidents Favor Abolition
of the Game, DECATUR REV. (Ill.), Dec. 29, 1905, at 3.
24.
Palmer E. Pierce, The Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States,
in 1908 PROC. supra note 20, at 26 (noting division at 1905 meeting between those who
wanted to abolish the game and those who wanted to reform it); see also Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N 146 (1930) [hereinafter 1930 PROC.] (noting that Pierce was
among those wanting to save the game in 1905).
25.
1930 PROC., supra note 24, at 146 (commenting on the broadening of the
agenda); see also infra Part I.B. (discussing the first NCAA constitution).
26.
For further discussion of the decision to oust athletics from student control, see
Carter, In Loco Parentis, supra note 22, 855-76.
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The use of athletic prowess for personal gain was said to be a widespread
practice and it was hinted, if not directly stated, that the college authorities were
cognizant of these violations of the principles of amateur sports.
Even the past history of many prominent athletes was brought before the
public and their character as men of truth and as gentlemen was severely
attacked. In a word it was claimed that many professional athletes were parading
under false college colors.
This sweeping condemnation of the prevalent ethics of college athletics
inaugurated a strong movement to reform the manner of playing the leading
intercollegiate sports.27

Although McCracken was instrumental in founding the NCAA,
he did not take a leadership part in its subsequent operations.28 The
group elected West Point’s Palmer Pierce as its first President. Pierce
would lead the institution for the better part of its first twenty-five
years, stepping aside briefly during World War I because of military
commitments.29 At the 1905 meeting, the sixty-eight schools selected
an Executive Committee and charged it to draft a constitution and
bylaws for the new entity.30
Because there was little or no support for abolishing football, a
compromise position emerged. First, the NCAA established its own
Football Rules Committee to consider how to quell the game’s most
dangerous aspects.31 Second, support was garnered for a resolution
calling upon individual faculties to strictly limit intercollegiate
athletics in favor of interclass and intramural games.
Resolved, That it is the sense of the Convention that, in the interest of the
proper work of education, the number of intercollegiate match games in all
branches of athletic sports, should be strictly limited by faculty vote.

27.
Palmer E. Pierce, The Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States,
in 1908 PROC. supra note 20, at 27.
28.
See 1908 PROC., supra note 20, at 6 (noting that McCracken had not met with
the group since its founding).
29.
Pierce served as president from 1905 until 1913 and then returned to the
Presidency in 1918 serving until 1929. 1907 PROC., supra note 2, at 26. In 1930 he began
service as the “Honorary President.” Id. The reason for the gap in service seems to have
been his military deployment. Id. As evidence by length of service, Pierce was a very
popular president. Id. Indeed, in 1907, he tried to tender his resignation after being called
to active duty and restationed at Ft. Leavenworth, KS but the delegates declined to accept
it. Id.
30.
The Intercollegiate Athletic Ass’n of the United States, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FIRST ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N OF THE UNITED
STATES 10-12 (1906) [hereinafter 1906 PROC.].
31.
Report of Secretary and Treasurer, in 1906 PROC., supra note 30, at 22.
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That interclass games and intra-mural athletics in general should be fostered,
to the end that a larger number of students may receive the benefits, and that
intercollegiate competitions be made rather an incident than the main end of
college and university athletic sports.32

For his own school, McCracken announced in 1906 that while
NYU was “bound, in company with various other universities and
colleges, to give the new game a trial,” its intercollegiate games would
be “comparably few,” and that intramural games would dominate.33
B. Drafting and Ratifying a Constitution and Bylaws: The Essentials
of an Amateur Program
On March 31, 1906, the NCAA’s Executive Committee, led by
Palmer Pierce, offered a constitution to the various schools for
ratification. 34 Article VIII made it clear that the parties were taking a
bold step beyond football, and even beyond intercollegiate athletics,
attempting to take control of campus athletics across the board:
The Colleges and Universities enrolled in this Association severally agree to take
control of student athletic sports, as far as may be necessary to maintain in them a
high standard of personal honor, eligibility, and fair play, and to remedy whatever
abuses may exist.35

However, by providing that institutions “severally” agreed, the
constitution also made it clear that the member institutions did not
cede power to the national body, but retained their autonomy. The
parties wanted an open relationship in which members were free to
date others; they did not want marriage.36 Thus, the constitution
expressly provided that “the acceptance of a definite statement of
eligibility rules” would not be a membership requirement and that,
“the constituted authorities of each institution shall decide on methods
of preventing the violation of the principles laid down in Article VI.”37
32.
33.

Id. at 25-26.
Trial of New Football; New York University Feels Bound to Make Experiment,
WASH. POST, April 4, 1906, at 8.
34.
1906 PROC., supra note 30, at 12 (Pierce noting his leadership); Report of
Secretary and Treasurer, in 1906 PROC., supra note 30, at 10.
35.
Intercollegiate Athletic Ass’n of the United States, CONST. art. VIII, in 1906
PROC., supra note 30, at 31.
36.
Id. at 12 (noting that it was clear that a constitution that required institutions
to cede power to a national body could not be widely ratified). For a more detailed
discussion of the evolution of the relationship among NCAA schools, see W. Burlette
Carter, Student Athlete Welfare in a Restructured NCAA, 2 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 1 (2000)
[hereinafter Carter, Student Athlete].
37.
Intercollegiate Athletic Ass’n of the United States, BYLAWS art. VII, in 1906
PROC., supra note 30, at 34.
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The constitution also spelled out the objective of the
organization quite plainly:
Its object shall be the regulation and supervision of college athletics throughout the
United States, in order that the athletic activities in the colleges and universities
of the United States may be maintained on an ethical plane in keeping with the
dignity and high purpose of education.38

The first constitution divided the country into seven districts, each of
which would render a report on athletic affairs in its region at the
convention. It embraced the principle of one delegate, one vote,
provided for annual meetings, and named the organization’s principle
officers, as well as an Executive Committee made up of the officers
and one member from each district not represented by the President
The Executive Committee was responsible for
or Secretary.39
proposing amendments to the constitution and bylaws and conducting
work of the Association in between conventions.40 The bylaws
provided that each district would render a report at the annual
meetings.41 As agreed, it also established a Football Rules Committee
within the NCAA. 42

38.
Intercollegiate Athletic Ass’n of the United States, CONST. art. II, in 1906
PROC., supra note 30, at 29.
39.
The districts were the New England States, the Middle States and Maryland,
the Southern States, the Middle Western States, the Northwestern States, the
Southwestern States, and the Pacific Coast States. Intercollegiate Athletic Ass’n of the
United States, CONST. art. IV., § 1, in 1906 PROC., supra note 30, at 29-30. It appears that
in 1911 the Southwest District was divided in two to form the Sixth and Seventh Districts
and a new Eighth District was added including the Pacific Coast, Colorado, Idaho,
Montana, and Wyoming. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, CONST., in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE SIXTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N 66 (1911)
[hereinafter 1911 PROC.]. The 1912 Eighth District report noted that there were some 40
Colleges in this district.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 8th District Report, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION 22 (1912) [hereinafter 1912 PROC.]. Later, after the number of
Pacific Coast increased schools, those schools became part of a new Ninth District. See,
e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, CONST., art. IV, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH
ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N 114-15 (1916)
[hereinafter 1916 PROC.]. By following the district reports one can have some view of
developments in each region. See also id. § 2 (listing the officers of the Association); id. art.
VI (providing for an annual convention and giving each delegate one vote).
40.
See, e.g., 1908 PROC., supra note 20, at 21, 23 & 29.
41.
Intercollegiate Athletic Ass’n of the United States, BYLAWS art. VIII, in 1906
PROC., supra note 30, at 36.
42.
Id. art. V. The first members of that committee appear to have been Dr. Henry
L. Williams (U. Minn.; chair); Prof. James T. Babbitt (Haverford), Lieutenant Charles D.
Daly (West Point); Mr. E.K. Hall (Dartmouth); Prof. James T. Lees (U. Nebraska); C.W.
Savage (Oberlin). See 1906 PROC., supra note 30, at 22-23 (thanking them for their service
to the NCAA).
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The bylaws set forth guidelines “suggested as a minimum.”43
They reflected a strong focus upon the principle of amateurism.
Because of the difficulty of access to these documents and the
importance of the original language used, I quote them extensively
here. First, Article VI defined the key “Principles of Amateur Sport.”
Principles of Amateur Sport
Each institution which is a member of this Association agrees to enact and
enforce such measures as may be necessary to prevent violations of the principles
of amateur sports such as
a. Proselyting.[sic]
1.The offering of inducements to players to enter Colleges or Universities
because of their athletic abilities and of supporting or maintaining players while
students on account of their athletic abilities, either by athletic organizations,
individual alumni, or otherwise, directly or indirectly.
2.The singling out of prominent athletic students of preparatory schools and
endeavoring to influence them to enter a particular College or University.
b. The playing of those ineligible as amateurs.
c. The playing of those who are not bona-fide students in good and regular
standing.
d. Improper and unsportsmanlike conduct of any sort whatsoever, either on
the part of the contestants, the coaches, their assistants, or the student body.44

In Article VII, the constitution went further to define eligibility
rules for student athletes.
1. No student shall represent a College or University in any intercollegiate
game or contest, who is not taking a full schedule of work as prescribed in the
catalogue of the institution.
2. No student shall represent a College or University in any intercollegiate
game or contest who has at any time received either directly or indirectly, money
or other consideration, to play on any team, or for his athletic services as a college
trainer, athletic or gymnasium instructor, or who has competed for a money prize
or portion of gate money in any contest, or who has competed for any prize against
a professional.
In applying this rule the constituted authorities shall discriminate between the
deliberate use of athletic skill as a means to livelihood, and technical,
unintentional or youthful infractions of the rule.

43.
See Intercollegiate Athletic Ass’n of the United States, BYLAWS art. VII, in 1906
PROC., supra note 30, at 34.
44.
Id. art. VI.
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3. No student shall represent a College or University in an intercollegiate
game or contest who is paid or receives, directly or indirectly, any money or
financial concession or emolument as past or present compensation for, or as prior
consideration or inducement to play in, or enter any athletic contest, whether the
said remuneration be received from, or paid by, or at the instance of any
organization, committee or faculty of such College or University, or any individual
whatever.
This rule shall be so construed as to disqualify a student who receives from any
source whatever, gain or emolument, or position or profit, direct or indirect, in
order to render it possible for him to participate in college or university athletics.
In case of training table expenses, no organization or individual shall be
permitted to pay for the board of a player at said table more than the excess over
and above the regular board of such player.
4. No student shall represent a College or University in any intercollegiate
game or contest who has participated in intercollegiate games or contests during
four previous years.
5. No student who has been registered as a member of any other College or
University shall participate in any intercollegiate game or contest until he shall
have been a student of the institution which he represents at least one college year.
6. Any football player who has participated in an intercollegiate football
contest in any College or University and leaves without having been in attendance
two-thirds of the college year in which he played shall not be allowed to play as a
member of the team during the next year’s attendance at the same institution.
7. Candidates for positions on athletic teams shall be required to fill out cards,
which shall be placed on file, giving a full statement of their previous athletic
records as follows:
Eligibility Card
Name of College or University.
Date.
Name of player or contestant.
Age of player or contestant.
Weight of player or contestant.
Branch of sport or contest.
Questions.
1. On what date this session did you register?
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2. Have you ever at any time competed for a money prize, or against a
professional for any kind of prize?
3. Have you ever received money or any other compensation or concession for
your athletic services, directly or indirectly, either as a player or in any other
capacity?
4. How many hours of recitations and lectures are you attending per week?
How many hours of practical work?
5. How long have you been a student at (Name of your institution)?
6. Did you receive any inducement or concession to attend (Name of your
institution)?
7. Have you ever participated in intercollegiate contests as a member of a
(Name of your institution) team? If so, state what team or teams, and when.
8. Have you ever taken part in any intercollegiate contest as a member of the
team of any College or University other than (Name of your institution)? If so,
state what institution you represented, on what team or teams, and when
9. Have you won an initial at any institution? (In your answer give the date
and place.)
10. If on a team in any other institution, what position did you fill?
11. Have you ever taken part, as a member of any athletic club team, in any
baseball or football game or games, or any track event?
12. Have you ever played baseball on a summer team? If so, what team or
teams, and when? Have you ever received for such playing any compensation or
emolument?
13. Did you hold a scholarship of any kind? If so, how and by whom awarded?
14. Do you hold any official position in your College? If so, at what salary, and
for how long have you held it?
15. Are you under a contract or understanding expressed or implied to engage
in athletics at (Name of your institution) for money or any other consideration or
emolument to be received from any source whatever, either directly or indirectly?
On my honor as a gentleman I state that the above answers contain the whole
truth, without any mental reservation.
(Date)(Signature).45

45.

Id. art. V.
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C. Growing the Membership
Although sixty-eight institutions responded to McCracken’s call
to meet in 1905, by the end of 1906, only thirty-nine schools had
ratified the NCAA constitution.46
Of these, only twenty-eight actually attended the first
convention in December, 1906. 47
When one looks at this list of original members, one notes
several things.
First, as discussed earlier, despite repeated
invitations, conspicuously absent were the members of the FRC.
Without these national academic and football powerhouses, the
NCAA’s power was limited.
Second, these original members were not representative of the
entire country.
Vanderbilt and North Carolina were the only
Southeastern Institutions, and there were only a few from the
Southwest, (although the University of Texas at Austin and
University of Virginia would join the next year).48 There were also no
institutions from the Pacific Coast states.
One possible explanation for the absence of some institutions is
distance and travel costs. But another clear reason for absences was
that some schools already belonged to strong conferences that had the
power to legislate for members.
For example, the Southern
Intercollegiate Athletic Association was organized in 1893.49 Western
schools could look to the Intercollegiate Conference of Faculty
46.
These original members were: Allegheny College, Amherst College, Bucknell
University, Colgate University, Dartmouth College, Denison University, Dickinson College,
Franklin and Marshall, George Washington University, Grove City College, Haverford
College, Lehigh University [Pa.], Miami University [Ohio], New York University, Niagara
University, Oberlin College, Ohio Wesleyan University, Rutgers College, Seton Hall
College, Swarthmore College, Syracuse University, Tufts College, Union College,
University of Colorado [Boulder], University of Minnesota, University of Missouri,
University of Nebraska, University of North Carolina [Chapel Hill], University of
Penn[sylvania], University of Rochester, University of Wooster [Ohio], U.S. Military
Academy [West Point], Vanderbilt University, Washington and Jefferson College, Wesleyan
University (Conn.), Western University, Westminster College (Pa.), Williams College, and
Wittenberg College. 1906 PROC., supra note 30, at 4, 11. But see Palmer E. Pierce, The
International Athletic Ass’n of the United States: Its Origin, Growth and Function, in 1907
PROC., supra note 2, at 29 (asserting that 38 institutions had ratified the 1906
constitution).
47.
1906 PROC., supra note 30, at 7-9 (listing the “accredited delegates”). Missing
were Amherst, Denison, George Washington, Grove City, Miami (Ohio), Tufts, Univ. of
North Carolina, Univ. of Pennsylvania, Rochester, Westminister and Wittenburg. Cf. id.
48.
1907 PROC., supra note 2, at 2-4 (listing the roll of members).
49.
See 1906 PROC., supra note 30, at 18; W.L. Dudley, 3d Dist. Rep., in 1907 PROC.,
supra note 2, at 9.
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Representatives and the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the
Southwest which dated back to 1895 and 1903, respectively. The Big
Ten Conference dates back to 1895.50 Institutions belonging to
conferences that had regulatory authority were hesitant to affiliate
with a national group that might conflict with their conferences’ will.
Conference membership was also a valuable commodity not to be
jeopardized.
One also notices that smaller colleges and universities
dominate the initial group. Smaller schools were less likely to have
large athletic programs and, consequently, were also less likely to
have a financial investment in the perpetuation of athletics, alumni
who would vocally challenge a cutback, or the budget to increase
athletics. As a consequence, smaller institutions were also more likely
to favor the reduction of intercollegiate athletics and specialized
training in favor of universal participation and intramural models.51
The delegates at McCracken’s first meeting were
overwhelmingly faculty members with professorial status and no
specific tie to an athletic department, with a few college presidents
Eleven schools sent representatives to the 1906
thrown in.52
convention as “visiting delegates,” including historically AfricanAmerican Howard University.53 The University of Chicago, an FRC
member, also visited in the person of its Director of Athletics, Alonzo
Stagg.54 Despite his visiting status, Stagg expressed his strong
support for the formation of a national organization, and, after
Chicago joined, he served on the NCAA’s executive committee for
several years.55
Recognizing that having two football rules committees was not
workable, the NCAA asked the members of the FRC to form a single
ruling group under the umbrella of the NCAA.56 The FRC’s members

50.
See Big Ten Conference, Big Ten History, http://bigten.collegesports.com/
trads/big10-trads.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2006). It was originally known as the
Intercollegiate Conference of Faculty Representatives. Id.
51.
Indeed, the Association of Colleges in New England passed a resolution to that
very effect in 1907. See F.W. Nicolson, 1st Dist. Rep., in 1908 PROC., supra note 20, at 9.
52.
1906 PROC., supra note 30, at 7-9.
53.
Id. at 9-10. Howard was represented by William J. Decatur. Id.
54.
Id. Chicago was represented by Alonzo Stagg. Id.
55.
Id. at 23.
56.
Intercollegiate Athletic Ass’n of the United States, CONST., art. V in 1906
PROC., supra note 30, at 33; id. at 22 (resolving to make invitation); Rep. of Comm. On
Membership, in 1907 PROC., supra note 2, at 17-18 (expressing willingness to revise
Constitution if members of the AFRC were to join).
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initially declined.57 By the time of the 1906 NCAA convention,
however, the parties had reached a temporary agreement, to be
renewed annually. Under it, NCAA football rules committee and the
FRC acted together as a single committee outside the NCAA
structure. That body was named the American Intercollegiate Rules
Committee (“AIRC”) or “the amalgamated committee.” 58 The NCAA
rules committee also created a subcommittee, a “Central Board of
Officials,” to be a central clearinghouse for those who would officiate
the college game.59 Through the joint football rules committee,
football legend Walter Camp and others would shape the future of the
game.60
The NCAA leadership realized that it could not claim national
relevance without national membership. To further this goal, the
NCAA published the addresses and the proceedings of its convention
and sent them free of charge to schools across the country.61 The
NCAA fashioned itself as a declarant of ideals only and expressed
support for the formation of local conferences, which it hoped would
behave consistently with NCAA goals.
But within a year, this aspirational-only approach was testing
the patience of those desiring changes in intercollegiate athletics. In
1907, the NCAA unanimously adopted an amendment to its
Constitution, stating that its members were “bound by the provisions”
of the NCAA’s Constitution and Bylaws and that legislation enacted in
conferences was binding upon members unless the institution
submitted a formal objection to the Executive Committee of the
NCAA.62 The next year the Association declared that although
individual institutions retained responsibility for details, the

57.
Rep. of Comm. On Membership, in 1907 PROC., supra note 2, at 19 (reporting
that Harvard and Cornell declined invitation to join; U.S. Naval Academy, Yale and
Princeton had not replied); see also Lack Power to Unite; Overtures rejected by Football
Rules Committee, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 1905, at 8 (stating that the original rules
committee lacks power to merge with IAAUS committee and must consult its individual
member schools).
58.
1906 PROC., supra note 30, at 13; Rep. of Comm. On Membership, in 1907
PROC., supra note 2, at 19.
59.
The Central board in turn appointed subsidiary regional boards. 1906 PROC.,
supra note 30, at 13-14. The reports of this subcommittee offer an interesting glimpse of
the history of intercollegiate officiating.
60.
See, e.g., Rep. of the Chairman of the Rules Comm., in 1907 PROC., supra note 2,
at 20 (noting Camp’s contribution).
61.
Address of President Palmer Pierce, in 1911 PROC., supra note 39, at 49 (noting
influence of organization).
62.
Rep. of Comm. on Summer Baseball, in 1907 PROC., supra note 2, at 24-25.
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Association expected each member to make a bona fide effort to
enforce the principles of amateur sports and encouraged members to
form conferences through which this enforcement could be secured.63
However, proposed language that would have authorized the
Executive Committee to hear evidence of offenses was rejected.64
The approach of disowning any claim to legislative authority
while still insisting on adherence to its constitution and bylaws
revealed a schizophrenia that would plague the NCAA throughout its
lifetime. The disease was born of the internal struggle between those
members who wanted a weak central body and absolute institutional
autonomy and those who wanted a strong NCAA with sanctioning
authority.65
Recognizing that more schools, and especially schools with
major athletic programs, were indispensable to their efforts, the
NCAA created a special Membership Committee to woo them. In
1907, the committee’s invitation letter assured recipients that “your
institution will lose none of its independence if it should join us in the
work.”66 In one of its most imaginative moves, in 1907 the NCAA
allowed schools to join together and seek membership within the
NCAA, either as a conference or as joint members.67 Each group of
joint members had a right to a single delegate.68 This plan was
ingenious, for it created a way for the powerful conferences to come
under the NCAA umbrella, raising the potential that they could be
subject to its control. It also allowed schools that could not convince
their entire conferences to come on board or could not justify the
minimal dues to band together in a membership.69 But the plan was
also potentially self-destructive. It stood to reason that if those
favoring amateurism within the NCAA could not control the
conferences, then the conferences would ultimately undercut
amateurism within the NCAA.
Each year the NCAA’s membership grew.
At the 1911
proceedings, President Palmer Pierce proudly reflected upon that
growth, noting, “In 1906, thirty-nine individual universities and
63.
Amendments to Constitution and to By-Laws, in 1908 PROC., supra note 20, at
22. see also 1930 PROC., supra note 24, at 28 (encouraging the formation of conferences).
64.
Amendments to Constitution and to By-Laws, in 1908 PROC., supra note 20, at
21-23.
65.
For more on this struggle see Carter, Student Athlete, supra note 36, at 6-26.
66.
Rep. of Comm. on Membership, in 1907 PROC., supra note 2, at 16.
67.
Rep. of Comm. on Summer Baseball, in 1907 PROC., supra note 2, at 25.
68.
Id.
69.
Id.
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colleges were on its rolls; in 1907, forty-nine; in 1908, fifty-seven; in
1909, sixty-seven; in 1910, seventy-six; and this year ninety-five.”70
One by one the members of the FRC joined. First was the University
of Chicago in 1907;71 then Harvard in 1909;72 then Princeton and
Cornell in 1914;73 Yale in 1915;74 and finally the Naval Academy in
1921.75 By the end of its first twenty-five years, the institutional
membership exceeded 150 schools. Today, of course, the number is in
excess of 1200 four-year institutions.
D. A Moral Charge
The NCAA’s founders viewed themselves as fulfilling a moral
charge and offering great national service by preparing young male
citizens.
The effect upon the national character of permitting intercollegiate contests to
be conducted under false pretenses . . . must be admitted to be seriously bad . . . .
There can be no question but that a boy or young man, who is habituated to the
endeavor to win games by means, some of which he knows to be unfair and against
the rules, later will play the game of life with the same ethical standards.76

NCAA President Pierce argued that the approach to athletics in
England allowed a personal tutor to guide a small group of students
on both the intellectual and athletics issues and thus, by promoting
amateurism, had a broad influence on national life in that country.77
Pierce said, however, that the English system could not work in
America, for the country was too large, its interests were too
divergent, and the tutorial system was too infrequent in America.78
He thus concluded that “[t]he same inference can become effective in
70.
71.
72.

Pierce, 1911 PROC., supra note 39, at 58.
1907 PROC., supra note 2, at 3.
Intercollegiate Athletic Ass’n of the United States, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FOURTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N OF THE UNITED
STATES 7 (1909) [hereinafter 1909 PROC.].
73.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL
CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N 7 (1914) [hereinafter 1914 PROC.].
74.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH ANNUAL
CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N 8 (1915) [hereinafter 1915 PROC.].
75.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTEENTH ANNUAL
CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N 3 (1921) [hereinafter 1921 PROC.]
(Although unlike in other cases, the conference proceedings do not report the admission of
the Naval Academy; that institution first appears on the membership roll in that year).
76.
Palmer E. Pierce, The Int’l Athletic Ass’n of the United States, in 1907 PROC.,
supra note 2, at 30.
77.
Id.
78.
Id.
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the United States only by the concerted efforts of educators, working
through national organizations.”79
McCracken also stated the charge in moral terms. He stated,
“When those activities of a young man which most fix his attention,
excite his ambitions and stir his feelings are kept on a high moral
plane, then a great deal is done towards making his a life of
morality.”80
As I have argued in a prior article, “Responding to the
Perversion of In Loco Parentis,” an important key to understanding
how NCAA institutions viewed their right, and indeed obligation, to
take over college athletics is the doctrine of in loco parentis.81 Vis-àvis their students, schools acted in the place of a parent, and could
indeed control student behavior both on and off campus, if they felt
Courts
that such control was for the good of the student.82
consistently rejected legal challenges to this authority, deferring to the
sound judgment of educators.83 Because they acted under the in loco
parentis doctrine, these educators never questioned the extent of the
authority they should have over student-athlete lives. Their power
was a given.
II. KEY DEBATES
A. Amateurs and Amateur Programs
As I have described elsewhere, the model to which framers of
the NCAA thought their students should aspire was that of the
gentleman amateur. An amateur was one who played sports as an
avocation, who derived his pleasure from the game itself and not
external factors such as fame or fortune.84

79.
80.
81.

Id.
1908 PROC., supra note 20, at 7.
See Carter, In Loco Parentis, supra note 22, at 852-53, 855-59, 862-63, 878-79;
see also Clarence A. Waldo, The Proper Control of College Athletic Sports, in 1908 PROC.,
supra note 20, at 40, 43 (“Long and undisputed custom has left things to the faculty and
properly so, for say what we will, the college faculty is in loco parentis.”).
82.
Carter, In Loco Parentis, supra note 22, at 852-53, 855-59, 862-63, 878-79.
83.
Id.
84.
Id. at 862.
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Amateurism purists were fond of citing something they called
the “amateur spirit,”85 which was a general way of approaching
athletics embodying morality and fair play. Conceptions of fair play
were a product of the times. Thus, actions like taking a time out
merely to upset the rhythm of an opposing team,86 blocking runners
from a base or attempting to pry runners off base,87 catchers talking
trash to batsmen and general talking on the field88 were considered
unsportsmanlike conduct indicative of a professional spirit not an
amateur one.
This spirit also prescribed fan behavior at amateur events. It
was considered inappropriate for a crowd to cheer or chatter in order
to rattle an opposing team during play.89 Indeed, one First District
report cited with giddy approval the behavior of losing fans at a New
England college who cheered winning fans as the latter group did a
triumphant snake dance on the field!90 An on-field snake dance by
winners would likely be received very differently by losing football
fans at most of today’s games.
Pure amateurists railed against paid or professional coaches
hired for merely a season or two. They argued that coaches should
come from the regular faculty; and at the very least, coaches should
have a permanent connection with the institution as educators or
volunteer alumni. As athletics began to spiral out of control, some
even argued that schools should return to using undergraduates as
coaches.91 Amateurism also defined how a coach coached. Proponents
argued that unless they were undergraduates like the players, coaches
should not coach from the sidelines during a game. Properly
85.
See, e.g., Luther H. Gulick, Amateurism, in 1907 PROC., supra note 2, at 40-43;
1908 PROC., supra note 20, at 11, 64. The amateur purists are also discussed in Carter, In
Loco Parentis, supra note 22, at 866-70.
86.
1911 PROC., supra note 39, at 31.
87.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, Comm. on Ridding College Baseball of its
Objectionable Features, PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N 41 (1913) [hereinafter 1913 PROC.].
88.
Comm. on Ridding College Baseball of its Objectionable Features, in 1913
PROC., supra note 87, at 42 (discussing catcher chatter); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASS’N 10 (1912) [hereinafter 1912 PROC.] (discussing “yapping” by players).
89.
See 1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 47.
90.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL
CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N 18 (1927) [hereinafter 1927
PROC.]. The Yale snake dance apparently dated back to the early 1900’s. See Yale, 6;
Harvard, 0; Sons of Old Eli Conquerors of Eastern Gridiron, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1905.
91.
For more on coaching see Carter, In Loco Parentis, supra note 22, at 861, 86869, 884.
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conducted, a coach’s work was done before the game. Thus, during a
game, coaches should either sit quietly on the bench or not appear on
the bench at all if they were not themselves students.92 In the view of
amateurists, this approach preserved the game as primarily a game
for undergraduates and avoided the image of professionalism.
Of course, the grand centerpiece on the altar of amateurism
was the principle that the amateur did not receive pay for play,
directly or indirectly. Amateurists opposed training tables and
scholarships based in any part on athletic ability.93 Most of the upper
classes and many in the middle considered it despicable to make
money playing sports or to play with those who did.94 The gospel of
amateurism was to guide all aspects of a sportsman’s life. Thus, in
1927, when golfer Bobby Jones, then married with a family, decided to
accept a job writing about golf while still playing as an amateur, he
set off a firestorm of controversy.95 Mary K. Browne did the same
when she sought to be a professional in tennis, while an amateur in
golf.96
Of course, amateurists opposed the training table and athletic
scholarships. On the latter point, the author of the Carnegie
Foundation’s famous 1929 report on athletics programs at schools,
asserted, “Athletic scholarships have no place in the American college
. . . .”97 And in 1930, the famous Carnegie Committee study on
campus-based athletics concluded that athletic scholarships were
“entirely inexcusable.”98 Somehow, it was believed, or at least
professed, that the mere acceptance of money in any form made it
impossible for a professional to enjoy the game for its own sake or to
aspire to lofty principles such as sportsmanship.
Similarly, if

10.

92.
93.
94.
95.

See, e.g., 1911 PROC., supra note 39, at 11, 31, 55; 1912 PROC., supra note 39, at

Carter, In Loco Parentis, supra note 22, at 862.
Id.
Grantland Rice, The Sportlight, BRIDGEPORT TELEGRAM, Apr. 27, 1927. The
author argued that Jones should be afforded a chance to make a decent living to support
his wife and children, given that other career options had not panned out for him
financially and since others were making money off of his name. Id. Moreover, he argued
that top rated amateurs were required to devote so much time to their sport it was
unreasonable to completely bar them from trying to make a living in another sport or
indirectly profiting from their amateur status. Id.
96.
Id.
97.
Howard J. Savage, The Elimination of Recruiting and Subsidizing, in 1930
PROC., supra note 24, at 127.
98.
Spec. Comm. Rep., Rep. of Comm. to Study Carnegie Found. Bulletin 23, in 1930
PROC., supra note 24, at 83.
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amateurs played with professionals, even if the amateurs did not
accept money, they might gain unfair advantage, and even worse,
bring the disease of professionalism back to infect amateur teams.
Theoretically, amateurism also defined a school’s approach to
its sports programs. Some who touted amateurism, objected to schools
using their programs for advertising purposes and doubted the value
of this argument as a reason for athletics.99 They objected to schools
collecting gate receipts, believing that these inevitably undermine the
educational purpose of athletics, by making the program commercially
dependent upon outsiders, and thus beholden to their views. Instead,
they argued athletics should be financed through the institution.100
These amateurists viewed the primary purpose of an institution’s
program to be athletics for all or universal participation. Thus, they
argued that intercollegiate athletics should be minimized and
intramurals should be the dominant approach. They argued against
intersectional games, which required students to travel long distances
and pitted unnatural rivals against each other. In their view, such
games overextended athletes and undercut the educational purpose of
sports. Purists were very much against specialized recruiting that
targeted athletes.
As I have argued elsewhere, the amateurism debate also had a
class context. Amateurists borrowed the concept of the gentlemanamateur from England. Pay for play was considered low-class and
beneath a gentleman, so amateurism’s values reflected some highbrow biases against the lower classes who regularly engaged in such
Opposition to developing
activities to make extra money.101
intercollegiate athletics also reflected opposition to educational
specialization in any form, a key tenet of supporters of the liberal
arts’s approach to education. Thus, the debate between proponents of
a liberal arts approach and those who favored professional training
directly impacted debates over specialized training and recruiting in
intercollegiate athletics.102 At the same time, some amateurists
genuinely felt strongly that students and education would be harmed

99.
See, e.g., 1911 PROC., supra note 39, at 3 (colleges should not use sport for
advertising); James R. Angell, The Familiar Problems of College Athletics, in 1930 PROC.,
supra note 24, at 109 (same view and also doubting advertising justification for athletics);
C.W. Hetherington, 6th Dist. Rep., in 1908 PROC., supra note 20, at 16.
100.
Dudley A. Sargent, Competition in College Athletics, in 1909 PROC., supra note
72, at 53.
101.
Carter, In Loco Parentis, supra note 22, at 862-64.
102.
Id. at 869-70.

234 VANDERBILT J. OF ENTERTAINMENT AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 8:2:211

if intercollegiate athletics programs were exploited by institutions,
and that it was their duty to protect both.
As with all religions, amateurism’s converts displayed ranges
of zeal. Each school felt free to let the spirit guide it as it saw fit. In
1927, one delegate dared state that he did not understand why schools
should not train athletes to enter the professional ranks, just as they
train students to enter law or business, or why willing alumnae should
not be allowed to provide students with financial support.103 In 1925,
another argued that it was impractical to insist on absolute
amateurism, given the refusal of institutions to finance athletics as
part of their general budgets.104 Some converts saw no inconsistency
in attacking others who professed professionalism, but supporting
professional tendencies in amateur programs. In 1925 the Chairman
of the Big Ten Conference attacked advocates of professional football,
but praised the college intersectional “bowl” games that lined
educational and private coffers and often took students thousands of
miles away from classes.105 Indeed, even as President Roosevelt
denounced the college athlete who accepted money for play, he
supported the moves of his 1905 group to expand intercollegiate
football and increase their gate receipts.106
Interestingly, it was baseball, not football, that presented the
greatest challenge to student adherence to amateurism principles in
the NCAA’s earliest days. This is true because by the time of the
NCAA’s founding, professional baseball teams and leagues were
already well established outside of colleges and universities, and
student participation in them during summer months and academic
years was widespread. Despite the high and lofty principles in the
NCAA’s constitution and bylaws, district report after district report

103.
104.

D.A. Penick, 6th Dist. Rep., in 1927 PROC., supra note 90, at 32.
See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL
CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 61-78 (1925) [hereinafter 1925
PROC.] (explaining the debate about whether amateur law should be enforced in all
intercollegiate competitions).
105.
See Big Ten Athletic Commissioner Sees Harm in Professional Athletics, IOWA
CITY PRESS CITIZEN, July 10, 1925, at 6 (discussing the speech of Big Ten Conference
Commissioner John Griffith); Big Ten Chief Explains Why of Intersectional Football, IOWA
CITY PRESS CITIZEN, July 10, 1925, at 6.
106.
Speaking to his Harvard Class, alumnus Roosevelt declared that the “college
undergraduate who in furtive fashion becomes a semi-professional is an unmitigated curse”
and argued that such students cannot help to put their country on a proper plane “if in his
own college career his code of conduct has been warped and twisted. See Honesty in Sport,
Roosevelt’s Plea: Semi-Professional Athlete Pronounced an Unmitigated Curse, POSTSTANDARD, June 29, 1905 (discussing President Roosevelt’s comments on the topic).
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soon made it clear that schools did not have the courage to declare
ineligible some of their best athletes on the basis of summer baseball
play. 107 Moreover, it was difficult to track student involvement in
summer games, particularly if the student was not inclined to report it
on the eligibility card. Thus, lacking NCAA legislative authority,
amateurism purists had to watch in frustration.
B. Preserving Academic Integrity Standards
A common problem for educational institutions was preserving
academic integrity in the intercollegiate athletic environment.
Alumni and the public pressured universities to admit students who
did not meet and could not meet the college’s admissions criteria, and
to waive academic standards for admitted students who were also
athletes. The term “sporty professor” came to be used for the professor
willing to alter athlete grades.108
Here too, however, the prevailing culture of education made it
difficult to protect intercollegiate athletics from outside influence.
Many schools refused to recognize athletics training as part of their
educational curriculum. Therefore, class schedules provided no time
in a crowded school day for athletes to train or practice, leaving such
The lack of recognition in the
work to after-hours periods.109
curriculum also meant no money provided to athletics in the general
institutional budget. Thus, to finance athletics, teams had to win. As
a result of these tensions, student athletes became overextended, both
academically and physically. The problem was exacerbated when
practices and games stretched into vacation periods and the pre- and
post-seasons.110
Early on, the conferences and individual schools took steps
toward establishing minimum requirements for athletes. These
included establishing admissions standards, establishing minimum
course hours for matriculation, limiting years of college competition

107.
E.g., H.A. Peck, 2d Dist. Rep., in 1908 PROC., supra note 20, at 11 (support for
summer baseball exception); 1912 PROC., supra note 39, at 33 (reference to summer
baseball promoters); S.V. Sanford, 3d Dist. Rep., in 1925 PROC., supra note 104, at 23
(summer baseball still a problem); see also Scott A. McQuilkin, Summer Baseball and the
NCAA: The Second “Vexation”, 25 J. OF SPORTS HIST., at 18, n.74 (1998).
108.
1906 PROC., supra note 30, at 14, 15.
109.
Dudley A. Sargent, Competition in College Athletics, in 1909 PROC., supra note
72, at 54 (noting college and student prejudices against athletics); 1911 PROC., supra note
39, at 43 (noting views of some that athletics incompatible with intellectual life).
110.
See discussion infra Part II.F.
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and banning freshmen from intercollegiate teams.111 The NCAA put
its support behind these efforts, but there was no uniform approach, to
curb transfers and school hopping. It also encouraged the wider
adoption of a “freshman rule,” requiring one year of residency at an
institution before one could play varsity athletics.112
C. Controlling the Rising Cost of Athletics
As institutions became more and more involved in athletics
management, they found themselves struggling to curtail the rising
costs of their programs. Two items were at the center of expenditures
concerns: new stadiums and top coaches.
As fan demand increased, institutions built stadiums to meet
that demand which resulted in competing institutions feeling a need
to do the same to keep up. Thus, the Ninth District reported in 1921
that two stadiums had been added among its schools and over one
million dollars had already been raised for a third.113 Ohio State
University completed a 64,000 seat stadium in 1921. That same year,
the University of Illinois had plans to build a 75,000 seat stadium.
Other Big Ten Schools were not far behind. Michigan, Chicago and
Wisconsin had new stadiums or new stadium plans in 1921.114 Brown
University erected a $750,000 gym in 1928.115 Nebraska broke ground
on a 30,000-person stadium in 1923.116 Vanderbilt celebrated its new
stadium the same year.117 Indeed, one convention speaker called the
twenties the “age of stadium building in America.”118 It would also be

111.
6th Dist. Rep., in 1906 PROC., supra note 30, at 21 (noting that district allows
three years of competition which must be completed in four and required 10-12 hours of
coursework); 6th Dist. Rep., in 1906 PROC., supra note 30, at 14 (noting practically every
6th district school follows freshman rule).
112.
R.B. Ogilby, 1st Dist. Rep., in 1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 31 (noting student
and alumni resistance to freshman rule).
113.
Leslie J. Ayer, 9th Dist. Rep., in 1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 49.
114.
G.A. Goodenough, 5th Dist. Rep., in 1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 42;
Comments of Pres. C.A. Richmond, in 1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 82; see also Big Ten
Schools Close Successful Financial Season; Five New Stadiums to be Built to Handle Large
Crowds, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Nov. 25, 1921, at 14 (noting building at Ohio, Michigan).
115.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, OLIVER F. CUTTS, 1st Dist. Rep., in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASS’N 18 (1928) [hereinafter 1928 PROC.].
116.
LINCOLN SUNDAY STAR, Oct. 14, 1923 (groundbreaking for Nebraska stadium
that seats 30,000).
117.
Vanderbilt to Have New Stadium, BEE, (Danville, VA), Aug. 22, 1923.
118.
S.V. Sanford, 3d Dist. Rep., in 1927 PROC., supra note 90, at 22.
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the age of debt accumulation for some schools, as they struggled to pay
the bonds that financed their new ventures.119
Proponents of this growth made several arguments in support.
First, they claimed that increased athletic presence provided an
advertising benefit that would lead to more buildings in traditional
programs such as chemistry and art.120 Second, they argued that if
colleges did not build stadiums, private enterprise would, and football
would fall into the latter’s hands.121 Professionalism supported by
private investors was an unspeakable evil.
In addition, many viewed top coaches as essential to winning
and such coaches were expensive. At the 1909 Proceedings, one
speaker complained that some coaches commanded salaries higher
than the college president at the same institutions.122 In 1921,
another complained of part time coaches receiving $10,000 for ten
weeks of work.123 These salaries were driven by the fact that winning
coaches came at a premium, particularly in an environment where
there was little or no job security for coaches.
D. Securing the Status of Coaches as Full Time Teachers
When colleges took the management of athletics away from
students, various organizational plans emerged. Famously, before the
NCAA’s founding, the University of Chicago’s President, William
Rainey Harper, created the position of Athletic Director (“director of
the Department of Physical Culture”) for Alonzo Stagg in 1892. In
1926, Harvard created the position of “Director of Athletics” and made
its holder a member of the faculty of Arts and Sciences.124 In 1906,
Yale reportedly made the director of its gymnasium a full professor,
after learning he was being courted by other schools.125 Walter Camp,

119.
See S.V. Sanford, 3d Dist. Rep., in 1928 PROC., supra note 115, at 28 (discussing
the building of stadium).
120.
S.V. Sanford, 3d Dist. Rep., in 1927 PROC., supra note 90, at 22.
121.
Leslie J. Ayer, 9th Dist. Rep., in 1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 49.
122.
James Roscoe Day, The Function of Intercollegiate Athletics, in 1909 PROC.,
supra note 72, at 37.
123.
R.B. Ogilby, 1st Dist. Rep., in 1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 29.
124.
Oliver F. Cutts, 1st Dist. Rep., in 1928 PROC., supra note 115, at 19; see also
Harvard Athletics, A Timeline of Tradition, http://gocrimson.collegesports.com/
genrel/101602aab.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
125.
See College Athletics, WASH. POST, June 4, 1905, at 2; see also C.W.
Hetherington, 6th Dist. Rep., in 1909 PROC., supra note 72, at 14 (noting that Midwestern
Colleges were using department of physical education with faculty director); Hollon A.
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the Director of Athletics at Yale, had a higher status than professor.
He was football royalty.
Unless he was a professor or an administrator, a football
coach’s job security was tied to winning.126 Some schools hired a coach
for the season only, releasing him after it was over. Some campuses
used alumni coaches who gave their time at a reduced rate. Others
had contract coaches for a year or term of years.127 But early on, very
few football coaches had professorial status, much less tenure or long
contracts.
At its 1910 convention, the NCAA adopted a resolution that
coaching and training should be “confined to the regular members of
the teaching staff, employed by the governing board of the institution,
for the full academic year,” and that athletics should “be made a
regular department, and receive the same consideration and be given
equal responsibility and be held to the same accountability as any
other department in the college or university.”128 Needless to say, this
idea did not immediately take hold. As resistance to integrating
athletics into the curriculum continued, so too did the precarious
situation of coaches.
E. Safety and the Future of Football
The first football reforms came out of the Roosevelt group.
They adopted rules recommended by the University of Pennsylvania
at their December, 1905 meeting. The rules barred kneeing and
slugging of players, imposed stiff penalties for rough play, added an
umpire, and shortened the halves from thirty-five to thirty minutes.129
In two major changes, the committee introduced the forward pass and

Farr, 1st Dist. Rep., in 1916 PROC., supra note 39, at 10 (noting that New England colleges
were still using student coaching in baseball).
126.
See 5th Dist. Rep., in 1927 PROC., supra note 90, at 28 (noting coaching
dismissals “without rhyme or reason”).
127.
Thomas F. Moran, Courtesy and Sportsmanship in Intercollegiate Athletics, in
1909 PROC., supra note 72, at 64-65 (discussing various coaching approaches used across
country).
128.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH ANNUAL
CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N OF THE UNITED STATES 35 (1910)
[hereinafter 1910 PROC.].
129.
Declares for Reform, Football Rules Committee’s New Policy, WASH. POST, Dec.
10, 1905; Trial of New Football, For Football at Harvard, Chicago Favors Rules, Yale
Athletic Reforms, WASH. POST Apr. 4, 1906; see also John B. Foster, Football As It is to be
Played This Year, DECATUR REV., Sept. 16, 1906 (reviewing rules of Football Rules
Committee).
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extended yards to down from five to ten.130 By extending yardage to
down, the Committee hoped to reduce mass plays that gain little
yardage but had the potential to impose great pain upon opposing
teams. With the same goal in mind, the Committee required that the
team in possession must have six men on the scrimmage line at all
times.131 Other changes included limiting timeouts to three per half,
the adoption of a neutral zone at the scrimmage line, new off-sides
rules, clearer fair catch signals, requiring the referee to whistle when
a player is “down,” and describing what being “down” meant.132
After its 1906 and 1907 meetings with the FRE, the NCAA
football rules committee reported that a key objective of the new rules
was to end mass play or piling up practices.133 The NCAA Report
notes that because the scrimmage line and yards to down rules
seriously restricted the offense, the new rules introduced the forward
pass and the onside kick as offensive options to even things out.134
According to the committee, larger schools complained bitterly that
these new rules tended to favor light, fast and versatile teams of the
smaller colleges versus the heavier and physically more powerful
teams that tended to populate the larger colleges.135
While these changes helped, a rash of football deaths in 1909
renewed criticisms that football was too brutal. In that year,
according to an NCAA Committee, newspapers reported thirty-two
deaths and numerous injuries in football. Among the casualties were
a West Point Cadet who died and an Annapolis midshipman whose
injuries were then believed to be fatal. The Committee claimed that
only four men on the list of dead could really be properly called college
players.136 It argued also that while the game had its risks, proper
attention to rulemaking and restricting play only to healthy mature
players could make it a game that institutions could be proud of.
Another delegate stated that he and others had investigated the
deaths and found that of the thirty-two deaths, eighteen “were not due
130.
See Declares for Reform, supra note 129; Trial of New Football, supra note 129;
Foster, supra note 129.
131.
See Declares for Reform, supra note 129; Trial of New Football, supra note 129;
Foster, supra note 129.
132.
See Declares for Reform, supra note 129; Trial of New Football, supra note 129;
Foster, supra note 129.
133.
Rep. of the Chairman of the Rules Comm., in 1907 PROC., supra note 2, at 20.
134.
Id. at 21.
135.
Id. at 21-22; see also Rep. of Football Rules Comm., in 1909 PROC., supra note
72, at 18-19.
136.
Rep. of Football Rules Comm., in 1909 PROC., supra note 72, at 19-20.
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to football”; three involved schoolboys from eleven to fifteen years of
age; one was a member of an athletic club; and five were college
students.137 He could not obtain information on the others.138
Whatever the makeup of those dead players, sentiment against
football was again aroused. Some even considered asking states to
make the playing of football a crime.139 Once again, however, the
saviors of football carried the day.
The joint Football Rules Committee went back to the drawing
board. This time it required that seven rather than six offensive
players remain on the line of scrimmage and prohibited offensive
players from pulling or pushing the man with the ball, presumably to
help him advance. In addition, the rules prevented players from
interlocking with each other on the line of scrimmage.
They
established forward pass interference rules and limited the forward
pass to twenty yards beyond scrimmage. They determined that a
kicked ball had to travel at least twenty yards to be valid (affecting
primarily the onside kick). Diving tackles and “crawling with the ball”
(referred to as “a well-recognized form of danger”) were prohibited.
The Committee determined that when a ball was kicked neither side
could interfere with an opponent within twenty yards of the line of
scrimmage. Stating that many injuries occurred when players were
overtired or exhausted, the Committee also reduced the playing time
for each half, introduced a three minute rest in the middle of each
half, and allowed for players to be taken out of a game at any point
and restored to the game at the start of any subsequent quarter.140
By the 1911 Convention, the NCAA began to require an
investigation whenever there were football fatalities among college
men. Insisting that one of the five deaths in that year involved a
young man with a preexisting condition, the report for that year
stressed the need for close medical supervision of students who wish
to play the game.141 At this time, of course, there were virtually no
guidelines for institutional medical care for student athletes, nor

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Football Reform, in 1909 PROC., supra note 72, at 27.
Id.
Id. at 25.
1910 PROC., supra note 128, at 27-28.
Rep. on Football Fatalities Among College Men, Season of 1911, in 1911 PROC.,
supra note 39, at 26-28 (reporting five college men deceased although questioning college
status of one).
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insurance programs to cover student-athletes142 for catastrophic
injuries resulting from a game.
F. Scheduling, Post-Season Games and Travel
Despite some founders’ hopes that institutional intervention
would lead to a de-emphasis of intercollegiate athletics, quite the
opposite occurred once institutions took control of collegiate athletics
away from students. The number of seasonal games played by college
athletes increased dramatically, and each major sport’s seasons
extended well beyond the academic year. By 1907 it was not
uncommon for a college team to play three baseball games a week in a
ten week season.143
“Intersectional Contests”—games between schools in different
conferences (and thus, different geographical areas)—posed yet
another problem. These intersectional contests were precursors to the
modern “bowl” games. Many of these contests predated the NCAA
and emerged as local governments and businesses recognized football
as a way to increase their exposure. The first nationally known
intersectional contest was the Rose Bowl. It emerged out of the
Tournament of Roses, an annual New Year’s Day event initiated in
1890 by the Pasadena Hunt Club to showcase the California city’s
year-round mild weather.144 The festivities initially consisted of a
parade, accompanied by a day of various athletic events.145 Soon,
however, the association and authorities got the grand idea of a “bowl
game.”146 In 1902 Stanford played Michigan in the first “Rose
Bowl.”147 But the “home” team lost so badly (Michigan walloped
Stanford 49-0) that city leaders opted for a chariot race the next
year.148 Still, football games returned for good to the festivities in

142.
The term student-athlete is actually a recent term developed in the 1950s. In
the time period covered here, the NCAA most commonly referred to student-athletes as
“boys” or students.
143.
Paul C. Phillips, The Length of Intercollegiate Athletic Schedules, in 1907
PROC., supra note 2, at 52 (noting the trend and questioning how students can do justice to
college work and play three games a week).
144.
Tournament
of
Roses,
Tournament
of
Roses
History,
http://www.tournamentofroses.com/history (last visited Mar. 27, 2006).
145.
Id.
146.
Id.
147.
Id.
148.
Id.
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1916, with the event using military teams in respect for wartime.149
Intersectional contests occurred in other sports as well, but football
presented the most elaborate examples.150
The political and financial backing of local governments and
businesses made intersectional contests difficult for many institutions
to resist. Although many bowl games were originally scheduled as
regular-season games, when the NCAA and others made attempts to
limit the number of games in a regular season these intersectional
contests were simply moved to post-season or pre-season play, thus
taking up more time in the student athlete’s schedule.151
The Pacific Coast schools were particularly defensive of
intersectional contest criticisms. Noting that they had to travel great
distances, even for regular season games, their NCAA district leader
observed in 1921 that he failed to understand why travel for
intersectional games was such an issue:
Here in the West, the term “‘intersectional contests”‘ is applied almost exclusively
to contests between teams from the far West and the East or middle West. We
have become accustomed on the Coast to games between institutions in the
northwest and those in the southwest. A team will travel from Los Angeles to
Seattle, a distance of 1400 miles, or from Missoula, Montana to Los Angeles, a
distance of 1700 miles, without exciting any comment. If a game is scheduled
between a western institution and one in the East or Middle West, however, the
distance to be traveled immediately draws attention and some criticism.152

149.
See
id.;
Tournament
of
Roses,
Past
Game
Scores,
http://www.tournamentofroses.com/history/gamescores.asp (last visited Mar. 27, 2006); see
also Los Angeles Sports & Entertainment Commission, History of L.A. Sports Events,
http://www.lasec.net/sptshistory.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2006); Carter, In Loco Parentis,
supra note 22, at 887-88 (discussing bowl proliferation into the 1940s); infra Part III for a
discussion of the impact of World War I on intercollegiate athletics.
150.
See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 3d Dist. Rep., in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N OF THE
UNITED STATES 31-32 (1929) [hereinafter 1929 PROC.] (noting that the invitation to the
University of Alabama to play in the Rose Bowl was “recognition of the fact that football is
played in one section of the country as another”) see also Leslie J. Ayer, 9th Dist. Rep., in
1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 50 (mentioning with approval “intersectional games”
between the University of Washington and Dartmouth and the University of Washington
and Penn. State); W.B. Owens, 8th Dist. Rep., in 1928 PROC., supra note 115, at 46 (noting
that in the Ninth District intersectional contests have occurred also in track, basketball
and swimming meets).
151.
G.A. Goodenough, 5th Dist. Rep., in 1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 41
(conference expressed disapproval of post season games); I.S. Ashburn, 7th Dist. Rep., in
1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 45 (noting 7th district season extends into the first week in
December); H.V. Carpenter, 8th Dist. Rep., in 1927 PROC., supra note 90, at 34 (noting
larger Pacific Coast Institutions playing Eastern schools in post-season); 1929 PROC., supra
note 150, at 46 (noting marked increase in East versus West games).
152.
W.B. Owens, 8th Dist. Rep., in 1928 PROC., supra note 115, at 46.
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Moreover, the same leader noted that the area’s conference found that
attempts to regulate schedules were “impracticable.”153
Another development that troubled some amateurists about
intersectional contests was the scheduling of games between schools of
different sizes. Smaller schools desired such match-ups because of
their moneymaking potential in local areas. Larger schools desired
them because, by playing institutions that were not their rivals, they
gained practice experience without possibly giving away any secrets.
These games also often took students far away from their college or
university.
The growth of post-season intersectional contests meant not
only an increase in the number of games students played, but also an
increase in the distances students traveled—by railroad—to play
these games, and an increase in missed classes. Some schools tried to
stem the tide. In 1908, Williams College adopted a limitation that
students could not travel more than 200 miles on athletic trips.154 But
supporters of these contests heralded the airplane, stating that it was
“only a matter of time” before that mode of travel would make game
attendance much easier.155
Of course as pre- and post-season games emerged, so did the
perceived need for starting practices earlier or extending them into
student vacations and recesses.156 Spring football practice became
more and more common, and, though controversial, opponents did not
or could not stop it.157

153.
154.
155.

Leslie J. Ayer, 9th Dist. Rep., in 1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 48.
F.W. Nicolson, 1st Dist. Rep., in 1908 PROC., supra note 20, at 11.
See 6th Dist. Rep., in 1907 PROC., supra note 2, at 11 (suggesting that railroad
travel and distance place a limit on growth of intercollegiate athletics); 8th Dist. Rep., in
1929 PROC., supra note 150, at 46 (noting that it will only be a matter of time before
airplanes will be used); Palmer, President’s Address, in 1929 PROC., supra note 150, at 73
(same). The Wright Brothers made their historic Kitty Hawk flight in December 1903, but
it would be decades before commercial flights capable of carrying large numbers of
passengers were available – and years more before athletic teams had the finances to take
advantage of such travel.
156.
1911 PROC., supra note 39, at 9 (noting survey that mentions need to limit
“Easter vacation games” and giving up of long trips); D.A. Penick, 6th Dist. Rep., in 1928
PROC., supra note 115, at 38 (referring to Thanksgiving game between A&M College and
Univ. of Texas at Austin before a crowd of 46,000).
157.
See, e.g., John Chester Adams, 1st Dist. Rep., in 1927 PROC., supra note 90, at
16; Special Comm. of Five on Football, in 1927 PROC., supra note 90, at 58-69 (providing a
survey of schools on spring practices and other issues).

244 VANDERBILT J. OF ENTERTAINMENT AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 8:2:211

III. WAR GAMES AND NATIONAL SERVICE
A. Responding to the Country’s Call
The United States’s entry into World War I had a dramatic
effect upon intercollegiate athletics in the United States. Prior to U.S.
involvement, references to the War at NCAA conventions were rare,158
but President Woodrow Wilson’s Declaration of War on Germany in
April of 1917 changed all that. It also changed intercollegiate
athletics, as the government immediately recognized the usefulness of
colleges and universities as excellent training grounds for the men it
would need to fight the War.
In the spirit of the times, the leaders of colleges and
universities struggled to determine how they might be of service to
their country. On August 2, 1917, the NCAA’s Executive Committee
met in Washington, D.C. to devise a plan for athletics during the war
era.159 The location facilitated the attendance of President Wilson’s
Secretary of War, Newton Baker.160 Speaking at that session, Baker
praised the athletics programs of colleges and universities and
credited them with providing men fit for and easily adaptable to
military life.161 However, he urged colleges and universities to
broaden their reach and to require physical exercise of every
student.162
It is to the colleges that the country looks to maintain the steady flow of youths
with preliminary training that best fits for the career of an officer. It is highly
important that the college athletic program be continued to equip young men for
the reception of military training. To attract young men to the colleges, nothing is

158.
In one exception, a speaker at the 1914 Convention argued that the US might
actually profit from the war, given the reduction in European trade, but that such easily
won prosperity could further weaken US citizenry, even as the War increased the courage
and endurance of Europeans. C.W. Savage, The Professional Versus the Educational in
College Athletics, in 1914 PROC., supra note 73, at 58-59. This softening of the US could be
offset, he argued, by widespread participation in athletics, which would lead to men leaving
their institutions physically, morally, and intellectually fit. Id. For a fascinating account of
World War I, including a war timeline, maps, text, key documents and video clips see First
World War.com, Multimedia History of World War One, http://www.firstworldwar.com (last
visited Mar. 28, 2006).
159.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWELFTH ANNUAL
CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N 20-21 (1917) [hereinafter 1917
PROC.] (quoting large sections of Newton D. Baker’s address).
160.
Id. at 49.
161.
Id. at 49-50.
162.
Id.
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more important than the continuation of athletic sports, and I trust there will be
no suggestion of the abandonment of college athletics because of the fear of lack of
decorum.163

Baker noted other ways that the direction of intercollegiate
athletics was not entirely consistent with the army’s goals.164 Noting
that institutions too often seek to develop men who were already big
and strong, Baker argued for athletics training for all – or at least all
young college men.165
There is one criticism that I have often felt constrained to make regarding
college athletics, and that is that the wrong men are developed. The big strong
men are taken and much attention is lavished upon them so that they are
developed into specialized athletes, while the weak and anemic are left to play the
part of observers. Gentlemen, there are not enough star athletes in the colleges to
fill our armies. What the nation requires is that all our young men attending
school shall have the benefit of physical training so as to develop their bodies and
make them proper material for filling the armies of the country in the present
emergency.166

Baker’s concern was immediate. Once the War began, more than onethird of young men called and otherwise eligible would be found
physically unfit for military service.
In December of 1917, just in time for the NCAA’s meeting that
year, Baker would again write to the NCAA and praise the worth of
collegiate athletic training and again urge that athletics should not be
limited to the few, but that participation should be widespread and
available to the student body at large.167 To his letter would be added
one by the Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, who also praised
the role of colleges and university athletic programs in preparing
young men for military training.168
At the December, 1917 convention, the full NCAA formally
adopted the recommendations made earlier by its Executive
Committee at the Washington meeting:
RESOLVED; That we recommend to all educational institutions, collegiate and
secondary:

163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Id. at 50.
Id.
Id. at 50; see also Frederic A. Woll, 2d Dist. Rep., in 1917 PROC., supra note 159,
at 24 (mentioning conference and attempts to be consistent with Executive Committee
recommendations); C.D. Coons, 5th Dist. Rep., in 1917 PROC., supra note 159, at 26 (same);
Roger H. Motten, 8th Dist. Rep., in 1917 PROC., supra note 159, at 34 (same).
167.
Palmer E. Pierce, President’s Address, in 1917 PROC., supra note 159, at 50-51
(letter from Newton D. Baker).
168.
Id. at 51-52.
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First. That athletic sports be made subservient to the work of military
preparation, and be made therefore an essential factor in military training.
Second. That intercollegiate and interscholastic schedules be arranged for so
long a time and so far as national and local conditions permit, and that all possible
encouragement be given to the development of intramural sports, with a view to
promoting the participation of all students.
Third. That professional coaching and the expenses incidental thereto be
reduced to a minimum.
Fourth. That there be no pre-season coaching or practice, no scouting, except
at a public intercollegiate contest, and no training table.
Fifth. That the number of officials at intercollegiate games and their fees be
kept as low as possible.
And further be it RESOLVED: That this Association reaffirms its belief in the
eligibility rules which it has already endorsed, including the freshman rule, and
therefore recommends that there be no lowering of eligibility standards during the
present crisis.169

Every program speaker at the 1917 convention focused upon the
institutions’ and the NCAA’s roles in the War effort.170
Beyond encouraging the colleges to offer athletics training to
all young men, the government also passed the National Defense Act
of 1916.171 The act authorized civilian rifle clubs under the control of
the National Rifle Association in cooperation with the U.S. War
Department, thus facilitating the formation of campus rifle clubs.172
At its December 1917 convention, the NCAA formally recommended
that colleges and universities throughout the United States adopt
military rifle shooting, “under the regulations of the National Board
for the Promotion of Rifle Practice, approved by the Secretary of
War.”173 Some schools had taken this step well before the resolution

169.
170.

Evening Session Minutes, in 1917 PROC., supra note 159, at 43.
See Palmer E. Pierce, President’s Address, in 1917 PROC., supra note 159, at 4752; William H.P. Faunce, Athletics for the Service of the Nations, in 1917 PROC., supra note
159, at 52-58; Dr. Joseph E. Raycroft, Training Camp Activities, in 1917 PROC., supra note
159, at 59-65; Dr. McKenzie’s Address, in 1917 PROC., supra note 159, at 70-73; W.P.
Reeves, The Adoption of Military Rifle Shooting as an Intercollegiate Sport, in 1917 PROC.,
supra note 159, at 73-75.
171.
Ch. 134, 64 Pub. L. No. 85, 39 Stat. 166 (1916) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 32 U.S.C.). The Act is credited with federalizing the National Guard.
39 Stat. at 197.
172.
39 Stat. at 211.
173.
Evening Session Minutes, in 1917 PROC., supra note 159, at 43.
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was passed.174 In the face of war and calls from the government for
support, a number of schools even began to impose such training as a
curricular requirement.175
The War Department also created a Commission on Training
Camp Activities. The Commission secured some of the leading men in
the field of amateur athletics to work along with the military in
devising athletic programs for the enlisted men stationed at various
military training camps.176 Walter Camp, for example, headed up the
Navy’s Training Camp Activities.177 At the December 1917 NCAA
Convention, Camp called on institutions to allow the military to
approach leading coaches and trainers to seek their service at the
military’s training camps saying “this is one of the big things that the
National Collegiate Athletic Association can do” to support the war
effort.178 Schools also scheduled games against the teams of these
various military training camps.179
Across the country, student athletes responded to their nation’s
call by enlisting. The war decimated many college and university
teams. As a result, powerhouses Harvard, Princeton and Yale
completely ceased their intercollegiate athletics programs. Harvard’s
174.
Hollon A. Farr, 1st Dist. Rep., in 1916 PROC., supra note 39, at 9-10 (noting
discussion of subject among New England Schools); see also W.P. Reeves, The Adoption of
Military Rifle Shooting as an Intercollegiate Sport, in 1917 PROC., supra note 159, at 73
(noting Ohio Athletic Conference voted to recommend recognition of rifle shooting as
intercollegiate sport).
175.
W.L. Driver, 7th Dist. Rep., in 1917 PROC., supra note 159, at 32 (noting nine
schools have added military drills as required curricular work, but not as a replacement for
intercollegiate athletics); Roger H. Motten, 8th Dist. Rep., in 1917 PROC., supra note 159, at
33 (University of Nevada requiring military drill of males).
176.
Dr. Joseph E. Raycroft, Training Camp Activities, in 1917 PROC., supra note
159, at 61 (discussing training camp creation and activities). Congress had started
summer military training camps for civilians as early as 1913 but the arrival of World War
I introduced a new sense of urgency and an expansion of the camp movement for both
enlisted and civilians. See generally, CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY, ARMY MILITARY
HISTORY, CH. 17: WORLD WAR I, THE FIRST THREE YEARS, available at
http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/AMH/AMH-17.htm (last updated Apr. 27, 2001)
(discussing role of Student Army Camps in providing needed soldiers); DONALD M.
KINGTON, FORGOTTEN SUMMERS: THE STORY OF THE CITIZENS' MILITARY TRAINING CAMPS,
1921-1940 (1995); Donald M. Kington, The Plattsburg Movement and Its Legacy, 6
RELEVANCE Q.J. GREAT WAR SOC’Y no. 4 (1997), available at http://www.worldwar1.com/
tgws/rel011.htm (discussing government sponsored summer citizen’s training camps from
1913 forward).
177.
See Navy Training Camp Activities, in 1917 PROC., supra note 159, at 11-12
(providing a Training Camp report on activities and needs).
178.
Id. at 12.
179.
C.D. Coons, 5th Dist. Rep., in 1917 PROC., supra note 159, at 27 (noting
contests).
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Le Baron Briggs, then Dean of Harvard College’s Faculty of Arts and
Sciences, informed the NCAA that the athletic department felt, as did
Harvard’s president, “that intercollegiate games are out of place now,
and that the continuance of them would lessen the emphasis on things
military.”180 But Briggs also admitted that Harvard had suffered a
significant loss of athletes to the military and was threatened at any
time with losing more to active duty.
Practically all our men from Varsity squads are gone or are subject to immediate
call. At any time we may hear that men who were closely associated with them
have been killed. Our bigger games, those with Yale and Princeton, have been
great public spectacles such as we do not like to be responsible for in times like
these.181

Briggs provided the NCAA with a copy of a report that he had written
for Harvard’s president explaining the department’s decision.
[T]he University teams as we have known them in recent years do not exist to-day.
The college has been severely blamed for suspending intercollegiate athletics.
Intercollegiate athletics in any recognizable sense of the name had become
impossible and almost unimaginable. The spirit that makes a man an athlete
makes him at the very first call of his country a soldier; and when war was
declared, our games with Yale, which had seemed the most important events of
life, became in a moment unrealities, to which no earnest man in a university team
or crew could give serious thought. Practically all our athletes who did not enlist
as volunteers gave themselves up to intensive military study and practice, till in
the summer all but two of seventy-nine men in the University football squads were
in some form of national service, or in training for it.182

Responding to those who said that Harvard should simply reconstitute
its teams with more players, since most of its rivals were similarly
crippled, Briggs said that while he viewed it as Harvard’s duty to
encourage sports, “in these times military training comes before
athletics, and claims more than divided allegiance.”183 He added that
spectacles such as the big football games with Yale and Princeton “are
unbecoming now, when the friends and comrades of the participants
are at the front, or on their way to it, and in imminent danger of a
soldier’s death.”184
Yale asserted a similar approach once the United States
entered the War:
At the declaration of war last spring all intercollegiate schedules were cancelled
and nearly every “Y” man and every undergraduate manager entered some form of

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

E. Herbert Botsford, 1st Dist. Rep., in 1917 PROC., supra note 159, at 13-14.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id.
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military service. At the opening of the fall term we made an attempt, which has
proved successful so far, to make athletic training an efficient factor in our military
establishment. It seemed to our Board of Athletic Control that athletics could
perform an important military function, and those in charge of military matters
here at Yale have cooperated heartily with us. Three days a week have been
devoted to foot drill and three to various forms of athletic spots. It was decided
further that membership on teams participating in intercollegiate contests should
be confined to members of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps [ROTC] and the
Naval Training Unit.185

Yale continued with intercollegiate games for freshman teams and
also sponsored informal teams and intramural games.186
As both Yale and Harvard’s reports indicate, many supporters
of intercollegiate athletics were none too pleased at their decisions to
discontinue intercollegiate sports.
And with competitive juices
flowing, some challenged the nobility of the Harvard, Princeton and
Yale approaches, saying that these schools were hiding athletic
infirmities under the guise of patriotism, preferring not to play than to
lose badly.187
While all suffered losses, the large majority of schools took the
approach of cutting back on intercollegiate athletic programs without
totally ending them. As a result, the rule barring freshmen from
varsity teams became a war casualty.188 Harvard, Yale and Princeton
aside, other New England schools continued playing football.
Wesleyan argued that if athletics had value during peacetime, they
certainly had value during wartime.189 Amherst argued that athletics
provided much needed diversion from the seriousness of military
training.190 Brown argued that continuing intercollegiate athletics,
though at a reduced level, was its “patriotic duty.”191 Explaining its
use of freshmen on varsity teams, Dartmouth said it could not justify
the expense of separate freshman teams during wartime, but vowed to
return to the “freshman rule” once the War was over.192
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 14-15.
E.g., Frederic A. Woll, 2d Dist. Rep., in 1917 PROC., supra note 159, at 20-21.
This district consisted of schools in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and West
Virginia. Id. A survey indicated twenty of twenty-eight schools reported that athletics
programs had been continued; only twelve of twenty-seven respondents reported
curtailment of athletics programs; and only two of those twelve reported canceling of all
schedules. Id.; see also E. Herbert Botsford, 1st Dist. Rep., in 1917 PROC., supra note 159,
at 13-14, 16.
189.
E. Herbert Botsford, 1st Dist. Rep., in 1917 PROC., supra note 159, at 17-18.
190.
Id. at 18.
191.
Id.
192.
Id. at 19.
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The War also had financial consequences for campuses
committed to athletic programs. Pacific Coast Schools argued that if
intercollegiate athletics fell, so would intramurals, for the latter were
largely supported by gate receipts of the former. They did, however,
agree to a lowering of gate fees.193
In 1917, Congress raised an additional concern by imposing a
War Tax on admissions at amusement events, which presumably
included athletic events. State educational institutions were covered
by an express exemption for state entities; however, private
institutions were not so protected. The tax posed a new threat to their
already diminishing wartime gate receipts. The NCAA used its new
relationship with the government to negotiate an exemption for
educational athletics.194
B. The SATC’s
Apart from encouraging student enlistment, the greatest
contribution that colleges and universities made to the war effort
came in 1918 with the introduction of the Student Army Training
Corps (“SATC”).195 The military was in great need of more soldiers,
particularly soldiers with the attributes that would make good
officers; and colleges and universities had a full well of such men.196
At the same time, massive student withdrawals and enlistments
threatened the stability of educational institutions. To address these
concerns, the War Department’s Committee on Education and Special
Training established the SATC program on hundreds of campuses
across the nation.197
The deal was simple enough. All schools with 1,000 or more
students would surrender their campuses as military training
193.
194.

A.D. Browne, 9th Dist. Rep., in 1917 PROC., supra note 159, at 35-36.
E.g., Evening Session, in 1917 PROC., supra note 159, at 44 (questioning
whether the war tax was to apply to educational institutions’ programs and noting a
committee to research); 1917 PROC., supra note 159, at 8 (discussing the appointment of a
committee to investigate applicability of war tax and, if applicable, secure its consistent
application to all schools); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, Rep. of Special Comm., in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTEENTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASS’N 27 (1919) [hereinafter 1919 PROC.] (illustrating that taxed schools were
subject to refund); see also No War Tax on Football, LINCOLN DAILY STAR, Nov. 2, 1917, at
12 (concluding that the University of Nebraska was not subject to tax).
195.
See Plans to Give Military Instruction in Colleges, FORT WAYNE NEWS AND
SENTINEL, May 21, 1917, at 15.
196.
See id.
197.
See id.
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grounds.198 They would encourage their male students (and the
government would later require them) to enlist in the army.199
Training for these enlisted men would be provided on the campuses
under the supervision of Army personnel, who would be based on
site.200 In return, the army would provide the institution with a fixed
amount of money per soldier.201 The SATC program put military
training front and center on university campuses. NYU, for example,
trained military men in both traditional education courses as well as
vocational ones.202 Its approach was typical of schools in the day, as
described in this excerpt from a report on the program written by the
NYU library staff:
At NYU, Captain [later Major] William S. Maulsby was the military program
commander, and Charles Snow, dean of the College of Engineering, was the
civilian director of the National Army Training Detachment. Fifteen committees,
made up of faculty and staff of the university, were appointed to administer
specific areas. The school agreed to provide the soldier with instruction, food, and
quarters. The government, in turn, agreed to reimburse the university a fixed
amount per soldier.
The first group of soldiers arrived on April 11 and, together with later
inductees, received instruction in such trades as auto mechanics, blacksmiths,
carpenters, chauffeurs, concrete workers, electricians, machinists, and radio
operators. During a two month period, the men received training in their trade,
military instruction and, beginning in July, a course on “War Issues.”
At the beginning of the fall semester, 524 institutions enrolled about 140,000
men into SATC units. At that time, the National Army Training Detachments were
absorbed into SATC as Section B vocationals. In all, between April 11 and
demobilization on December 19, 1918, 1,613 men took part in this section at NYU.
NYU agreed to accept 2,000 men. The NYU SATC unit eventually enrolled
1,564 student-soldiers in two divisions: 1,288 at University Heights and 276 at
University and Bellevue Hospital Medical College. . . .
. . . [T]he collegiate or Section A SATC students were required to fulfill the
requirements for college admission and to be accepted as matriculated students by
the school. Inducted as privates in the regular army and subject to military
discipline, the student-soldiers lived in barracks, ate at mess and were accorded a

198.
199.
200.
201.

See id.
Id.
Id.
See id.; see generally CAROL S. GRUBER, MARS AND MINERVA: WORLD WAR I AND
THE USES OF HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA (Louisiana State University Press 1975).
202.
See New York University Archives, Guide to the Records of the Student Army
Training Corps, 1916-1921, http://dlib.nyu.edu:8083/archead/servlet/
SaxonServlet?source=/satc.xml&style=saxon01a2002.xsl (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
Numerous other institutions have online library sites discussing the content of their
respective SATC files.
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monthly allowance of $30, in addition to having their tuition paid. They were to
receive a total of 42 hours of “essential” and “allied” subjects while also performing
military drill for 11 hours per week. Essential courses included “military law and
practice,” “hygiene and sanitation,” “surveying and map making,” “modern
ordinance,” and the “war issues” course. At the end of their studies [between one
and three terms, depending on age] the students were assigned to officer or noncommissioned officer training programs, a depot brigade, or permitted further
study in engineering, medicine, or law.203

The impact of the SATC’s is clearly reflected in NCAA
Proceedings for 1918. At that convention NCAA Vice President
Samuel Beyer (Iowa State), addressing the 1918 convention in the
absence of Palmer Pierce, noted the schools’ contributions with pride,
saying most colleges had “turned their plants over to the Federal
authorities,” and that “[a]thletics became a part of the military
establishment.”204 As the above excerpt explains, however, the
transition from civilian educational campus to military training center
was not without its problems. Intercollegiate athletics—and in some
cases, ordinary athletics in general—were brought to a virtual
standstill on America’s college and university campuses as military
training took precedence. And although the NCAA’s 1917 resolution
urged that eligibility standards not be lowered, institutions were
forced to abandon eligibility rules, such as amateurism requirements,
because many of the military’s prospects could not meet them, and it
was felt that the military’s expressed needs should override such
rules.205
The SATC’s also changed campus life for all students
dramatically.
While affirming their patriotism, leaders of
intercollegiate athletics often referred to the impact of the SATC’s as
demoralizing for students, faculty and staff.206 Support for this view is
also reflected in a report prepared by the Penn State library on the
program at that campus.
203.
204.

Id.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, S.W. Beyer, Vice President’s Address, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTEENTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASS’N 37 (1918) [hereinafter 1918 PROC.] (noting with pride that many colleges
have done so); see E. Herbert Botsford, 1st Dist. Rep., in 1918 PROC., at 13-14 (noting that
Williams College and Yale have done so).
205.
Frederic A. Woll, 2d Dist. Rep., in 1918 PROC., supra note 204, at 17; J.B.
Crenshaw, 4th Dist. Rep., in 1918 PROC., supra note 204, at 20 (showing that eligibility
rules were cast aside and professionals were allowed)
206.
R.T. Abercrombie, 3d Dist. Rep., in 1918 PROC., supra note 204, at 18 (stating
that SATC brought football to a standstill and was demoralizing for students); J.C. Futrall,
7th Dist. Rep., in 1918 PROC., supra note 204, at 21 (although a few smaller schools noted
benefits, larger schools generally reported SATC produced reduced student morale in all
respects).
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The SATC snuffed out the remnants of student social life at Penn State.
Undergraduates had to wear uniforms at all times and observe military
regulations just as they would at any other military base. To meet the demand for
additional living quarters, fraternity houses were converted to barracks, two new
barracks were erected on Old Beaver Field, and a mess hall was built adjacent to
McAllister Hall. A rigidly prescribed schedule governed daily activities, with
students rising promptly at 7:00 A.M., marching to and from classes and meals,
and observing a strict 8:30 P.M. curfew. While this routine bore only an
approximate resemblance to real military life-surely most troops on active duty did
not enjoy the luxury of a seven o’clock reveille-and was well insulated from the
horrors of combat, it did make freshman customs seem downright childish by
comparison. Among the five hundred undergraduates disqualified from the SATC
(that is, female students and males who did not pass the physical exam), green
dinks and ribbons disappeared as quickly as the old taboo prohibiting freshmen
from walking on the grass. Compulsory attendance at daily and Sunday chapel was
also discontinued for the first time in the College’s history.207

Friction developed between campus leadership and military
officials over who should be in charge on campuses. The matter
reached such a point that, after the War, some colleges resisted plans
to establish Reserve Officers Training Corps (“ROTC”) units on their
campuses.
To quell the rising storm, the military sent a
representative to the NCAA to express its interest in making changes
to alleviate any of the schools’ concerns.208
As if relegating their campuses to military control were not
enough, the worldwide flu pandemic of 1918 made matters worse for
students and supporters of intercollegiate athletics. The pandemic
caused hundreds of thousands of deaths worldwide.209 In the United
States, state health authorities outlawed or limited athletic events
like football games for fear that they might lead to a spread of the
disease.210 The flu epidemic, coupled with the changes wrought by the

207.
Michael Bezilla, Doughboy Center, Penn State Goes to War,
http://www.worldwar1.com/dbc/pennstate.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2006) (providing a case
study of Penn State’s involvement in the War and general discussion of how colleges across
the nation supported the War effort and also displaying pictures of the Penn State SATC).
208.
See Stenographic Rep. of Discussion at the Evening Session, in 1918 PROC.,
supra note 204, at 100-02 (Colonel Frank P. Morrow speaking of unhappy experience of
SATCs, urging support for ROTC and expressing willingness to work out difficulties);
Stenographic Report of Discussion at the Evening Session, in 1918 PROC., supra note 204,
at 99 (Chairman introducing Morrow and noting past friction between military and
educational leaders).
209.
Molly Billings, (June 1997), http://www.stanford.edu/group/virus/uda/ (noting
that more people died from this epidemic than in World War I itself).
210.
See, e.g., Roger H. Motten, 8th Dist. Rep., in 1918 PROC., supra note 204, at 2223.
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War, spelled disaster for all but the most modest campus athletic
programs.211
C. Recovering from War
While no one wanted war, some saw a silver lining, suggesting
that World War I offered an opportunity to remedy the evils of
intercollegiate athletics. The president of Brown University, William
Faunce, argued that the war was offering a “priceless opportunity for
appraisement and revision,” a chance to strip away the extravagant
approaches that have led to abuse and criticism.212 While stressing
the need to reinforce eligibility rules, he also argued for a model of
universal participation. “The army has no interest in developing a few
Samsons or Sandows. It is interested in a campaign to develop every
man in the line.”213 Harvard’s LeBaron Briggs opined that if colleges
“fail to reduce the expense of coaching and training, to inculcate
notions less luxurious, and to foster a better understanding of the
relation between athletics and other interests of life, we shall lose one
of the opportunities so dearly bought by this war.”214
Addressing the December 1918 convention, Dean J.R. Angell,
then of the University of Chicago (later president of Yale) also saw the
War’s end as an opportunity, saying that “now the critical moment has
come when we must decide whether the old system, compact, as it
was, of good and evil, shall be revived, or whether instead we shall try
to build a bigger, better, and more enduring one.”215 Angell then
proceeded to offer what he called his “Brief Confession of Faith in
Matters Athletic,” listing what he deemed the essentials of a solidly
amateur intercollegiate athletics program.216 In addition to calling for
an end to training tables, he stated:
I believe that the chief aim of college athletics should be the physical and moral
improvement of the entire group . . . rather than the production of a few highly
trained semi-professionals . . . .
....

211.
See, e.g., id. at 22 (flu epidemic and war requirements have played havoc with
athletics).
212.
William H. P. Faunce, Athletics for the Service of the Nation, in 1917 PROC.,
supra note 159, at 57.
213.
Id.
214.
E. Herbert Botsford, 1st Dist. Rep., in 1917 PROC., supra note 159, at 14-15.
215.
J.R. Angell, The Reconstruction Program for Physical Education in the Colleges,
in 1918 PROC., supra note 204, at 45.
216.
See id. at 46-48.
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I believe that amateurism is an absolute essential to wholesome college games
and that it means high-minded love of gentlemanly sport for its own sake.
I believe that professionalism consists of a spirit, a point of view . . . . Men who
play for motives other than the love of the game, men to whom victory, however
won, is the controlling end, are men already on the road to professionalism, men
who have in some measure sacrificed their amateurism.
I believe that a good deal of the professional training of athletic teams,
particularly in football, has been grossly objectionable in overworking boys whose
primary obligation is to the academic aims of the college. The result has often been
that the boy has done neither job well – has been too exhausted to study and too
much disturbed at his class deficiencies to put his whole spirit into the games.
I believe that any system [that allowed] proselyting among boy athletes in
secondary schools is pernicious . . . .
. . . I believe that high-priced temporary coach is inimical to the development of
a permanently high tone in the athletic affairs of a college . . . .
. . . I do not believe there is any obligation on the part of the college to furnish
the general public with substitutes for the circus, the prize fight, and the
gladiatorial combat.
. . . I do not believe that there are convincing statistics to prove the supposed
advertising value of successful athletic teams . . . .
I do not believe the possible benefit gained by a few men trained for spectacular
contests is an adequate offset for the time and money invested, the distortion of
social and educational values, both inside and outside the college, and the
unequivocal loss to the mass of undergraduates arising from the concentration of
interest in the athletic exploitation of a favored few.217

Angell further argued that, “both in the legal and in the moral sense of
the word,” athletics was frequently being controlled by those outside
the institutions.218
Certainly, the War offered supporters an opportunity to tout
the value of athletics and its appropriate place in a school’s regular
curriculum. By exposing so many undergraduate males to physical
education, it secured converts to the gospel of physical fitness. VicePresident Beyers noted in 1918 that athletes tended to be less subject
to diseases. “It is a matter of common knowledge that the army and
navy authorities were inclined to place college athletes in a preferred
class as officer material.”219 It stood to reason, he said, that when the

217.
218.
219.

Id. at 46-48.
Id. at 48.
S.W. Beyer, The Vice President’s Address, in 1918 PROC., supra note 204, at 37.
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war ended trades, industries and professions would be equally
discriminating.220
Upon the end of the war, features of collegiate athletics deemed
objectionable again reared their heads. Hoping to mend its tattered
blanket of eligibility rules, the NCAA passed resolutions reaffirming
its pre-War positions:
Resolved, That the Association reaffirms its previous resolution, that seasonal
coaches, scouting (except at public intercollegiate contests), training tables,
organized training or coaching in the summer vacation, and post-season games are
menaces to the spirit of amateur college athletics, and are contrary to the aims of
this Association.221

But not all were convinced that schools were taking advantage
of the new opportunity to reform athletics. A year later, in 1920, the
reporter for the Second District argued that the prevailing situation
was worse than when the NCAA was first formed:
We still have the seasonal coach; this is a mild abuse . . . . Pre-season training,
training camps, and summer camps are the rule and not the exception. The extent
of the training table is governed only by the size of the bank account . . . . Scouts
looking among the preparatory schools for material are numerous and active, and
their “offers” to desirable boys range from a “scholarship” up through “tuition,”
“board and room,” “books and clothes,” “spending money,” to a flat salary of so
much per annum. There are cases in the minds of each one of you of men
migrating from one college to another. These travelers are very often good
athletes. They seem to go from a college of more moderate financial means to one
more blest . . . . There is no use dealing in particulars or going farther into
conditions . . . . To say we are back to conditions existing when this organization
first started is covering the truth.222

This speaker opined that these problems would continue “as long as
there is an income at the gate.”223
In contrast, others argued the post-War period was an
opportunity to exploit intercollegiate athletics further to the good of
the programs and their institutions. The Ninth District’s reporter
offered a rosy picture in 1920, asserting that scouting at secondary
schools had been eliminated, that there was “entire accord” on
eligibility rules, and that there were “flourishing conditions within the
[west] coast colleges” and “the most cordial good will and co[o]peration
on the part of the public.”224 He further noted that, assisted by the
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 37.
Miscellaneous Business, in 1919 PROC., supra note 194, at 55.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, E.C. Huntington, 2d Dist. Rep., in PROCEEDINGS
OF THE FIFTEENTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N 13
(1920) [hereinafter 1920 PROC.].
223.
Id. at 14.
224.
H.C. Howe, 9th Dist. Rep., in 1920 PROC., supra note 222, at 26.
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addition of paved roads, “The public interest in college athletics,
which, during the war, lapsed so completely that the contests could no
longer be financed, has now brought out larger crowds than before the
war.”225 He heralded, as well, the great success of Rose Bowl games.
IV. SEGREGATION AND ATHLETICS “FOR MEN”
Up to this point, the focus of this article has been upon what
was discussed in the early NCAA proceedings. But it is worthy to note
what was not discussed. One finds little discussion of minorities or
women. The primary aim of the NCAA’s founders, like the aim of so
many leaders of that time, was to satisfy the needs of the young white
males who they envisioned would be the country’s leaders.
Though not inevitable, these approaches were a product of the
times. Until the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in August
1920, women could not vote and were denied other citizenry rights.
But the War pressed women into new decision-making positions at
home, and in the workplace. After the War ended in 1918, the
movement for women’s rights gained new steam. Among the targets of
that agitation were institutions that belonged to the NCAA. In his
1922 convention report, one district reporter commented that there
was widespread and sustained interest in women’s athletics programs
in his district, and he hoped that the NCAA would take the matter up.
This agitation was likely increased by the fact that other groups,
including NCAA’s then nemesis, the Amateur Athletic Union (AAU),
had opened their events to women and minorities, and also to the
formation of the National Amateur and Athletic Federation, whose
goal was to put women and men’s athletic programs on equal
footing.226
Still, the NCAA was resistant. The only hints that the NCAA
was open to expanding women’s participation in sports are oblique
references to alliances that might be formed with amateur sports
organizations that welcomed women, including groups like the Young
Women’s Christian Association, the National Amateur Athletic
Federation (which had a men’s and women’s division) and, on
occasion, the AAU.227 There were no women in the NCAA leadership;
225.
226.

Id. at 25.
For a fascinating progress report on women’s sports from 1900 to 1929 see St.
Lawrence County Branch, History of Women in Sports Timeline, Pt. II,
http://www.northnet.org/stlawrenceaauw/timelne2.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
227.
E.g., 1911 PROC., supra note 39, App. at 11; Palmer E. Pierce, Rep. on the
National Amateur Athletic Federation, in 1925 PROC., supra note 104, at 55-56.
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they were not represented among the delegates attending the
convention; they were not represented in significant numbers among
the faculty of these bodies, not to mention their athletics staffs; nor
did they occupy significant positions in the governmental bodies that
might press change.
Occasionally, sympathetic actors in the
predominantly male sports media would run an article or two about
successful sportswomen, but generally notice of or interest in women’s
involvement in sports was few and far between.228
Of course, the resistance to women’s involvement in athletics
was not only from men. As calls for more female sports participation
increased, even some women joined arguments that competition and
vigorous activity were not feminine and that participation in athletics
might be physically harmful to the female body.229 In 1938, the
director of New York State’s Department of Education, who also was
the chair of the State’s Physical Education Association, barred
interschool competition for girls at New York public schools. He
established an all female commission to protect the perceived feminine
traits of girls against the perils of “too vigorous a sports program.”
Not everyone agreed with this approach, however, and he complained
that commercial and community interests were impeding the work of
protecting girls from the dangers of competition.230
Lest the reader think that resistance within the NCAA to
including women in its intercollegiate athletics championships was
limited to a narrow earlier period, it should be noted that the NCAA
would retain its male-only position for a number of years, even as its
individual institutions began to dramatically broaden their women’s
sports programs. In 1964, the NCAA’s executive committee rejected a
call from women’s groups and their own long range planning
committee to include women’s sports in their championship events,
issuing the following regulation: “The games committee shall limit
participation to eligible male athletes.”231 The NCAA Council set up a
committee to meet with women’s sports groups to discuss how women
228.
See Sybil Bauer, Swimming Star, for Women in All Sports, SHEBOYGAN PRESSTELEGRAM, Mar. 30, 1923, at 3 (discussing views of Northwestern University studentathlete).
229.
Royal S. Copeland, Are Sports Harmful to Girls?, STAR (Marion, Ohio), Sept. 10,
1930. Contra Sybil Bauer, supra note 228, at 3.
230.
Too Vigorous Athletics by Women Hit, SYRACUSE HERALD-AMERICAN, Oct. 15,
1939.
231.
Ladies Locked Out as NCAA Remains Strictly for Men, NCAA NEWS, May 1964,
at 1, available at http://web1.ncaa.org/web_video/NCAANewsArchive/1964/
196405.pdf.
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could take advantage of some of the benefits offered by the NCAA.232
Four years later in 1968, the NCAA joined with Chevrolet Motor
Division to sponsor the first “College Football Centennial Queen”
contest. Each major conference was to select a candidate for “queen”
to be voted upon by fans.233 The December issue also featured a
spread with pictures of and a short write-up about each candidate for
queen.234
Things would remain the same at the NCAA until Congress
passed Title IX in 1972. In light of that statute, and upon advice of
legal counsel, the NCAA rescinded its rule prohibiting female athletes
from competing in NCAA-sponsored events. That same year, the first
female competed in a NCAA Championship, the NCAA’s National
Swimming and Diving Championship. But separate championships
for women would not be created until 1981.235 Today, of course, while
many would argue there is still much to be accomplished, female
participation in NCAA sports is widespread.
Minority student athletes were also denied opportunities in the
early years of the NCAA. Despite the fact that the first NCAA
constitution provided that “[a]ll Colleges and Universities in the
United States” were eligible for membership in the association,236
minority colleges had a difficult time joining the NCAA.
No
historically black institutions were among its original members, even
though, as noted earlier, historically African American Howard
University was an early participant in NCAA conferences as a visitor.
Black teams and white teams that had black players also had to deal
with state “Jim Crow” laws barring blacks from certain public places
and prohibiting blacks and whites from playing together. Even when
interracial play was not barred by law, white schools, teams, or
232.
Id. A good overview of women in NCAA competition is found in Kaye Hawes,
Women’s Sports Enter NCAA Arena, THE NCAA NEWS, Dec. 6, 1999, available at
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/portal/ (search for “hawes ‘women’s sports enter’ ”).
233.
First Centennial Queen Candidates Chosen, NCAA NEWS, Nov. 1968, at 1,
available at http://web1.ncaa.org/web_video/NCAANewsArchive/1968/196811.pdf; Grid
Queen Balloting Is Now Underway, NCAA NEWS, Dec. 1968, at 1, available at
http://web1.ncaa.org/web_video/NCAANewsArchive/1968/196812.pdf; see also Centennial
Queen Barbara Specht Begins Reign, NCAA NEWS, Feb. 1969, at 5-6, available at
http://web1.ncaa.org/web_video/NCAANewsArchive/1969/196902.pdf.
234.
First Centennial Queen Candidates Chosen, supra note 233, at 6-7.
235.
See Hawes, supra note 232. According to Hawes, the NCAA actually sought
Congressional support for exclusion from Title IX stating that it would irreparably damage
men’s intercollegiate athletics. Id.
236.
Intercollegiate Athletic Ass’n of the United States, CONST. art. II, in 1906
PROC., supra note 30, at 29.
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coaches sometimes refused to play if it meant they had to play with or
against black players.237 In the first quarter of its existence, the
NCAA ignored the problems that racial discrimination posed for
intercollegiate athletes. Athletics for all did not really mean athletics
for everyone. The AAU, by contrast, took a very different stance,
advocating equal opportunity and sponsoring championships for teams
at minority educational institutions.238
Unable to find widespread acceptance among the memberships
of the white conferences black institutions combined to form their own
Colored Intercollegiate Athletic Association (“CIAA”) in 1912, which
was based at Hampton Normal and Agricultural Institute (later
Hampton University).239 They also began to sponsor their own meets
and championships.240 The CIAA became a conference member of the
NCAA in 1921,241 and in 1924, Howard University became the first
historically black college elected to individual membership.242 These
admissions did not, however, compel NCAA member institutions to
compete against them.
Another predominantly minority institution, the Carlisle
Indian School, did from time to time attract the NCAA’s attention.
Carlisle was the nation’s first off-reservation federally supported
school for Indians. Its most famous athlete is Jim Thorpe, who won
both the decathlon and the pentathlon at the 1912 Olympic Games.
237.
See, e.g., Nebraska Men Assert No Agreement to Bar Negroes Exists, LINCOLN
DAILY NEWS, Oct. 28, 1913, at 3 (reporting that Nebraska University denied that
“gentlemen’s agreement” existed by which no black athletes could compete in Missouri
Valley collegiate athletics, but conceding that officials were asked to discourage
competition by Negroes; also noting student support for a black player).
238.
See Plan to Transfer Title Track Meet Is Disproved, BRIDGEPORT TELEGRAM,
Apr. 27, 1927, at col. 7 (discussing possibility that the AAU may have to move its national
title track meet from New Orleans after the city refused to guarantee equal treatment of
“colored athletes”).
239.
See HoopHall.com, Black Colleges: Separate but Equal, in FREEDOM TO PLAY:
THE
LIFE
AND
TIMES
OF
BASKETBALL’S
AFRICAN-AMERICAN
PIONEERS,
http://www.hoophall.com/exhibits/freedom_black_colleges.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
The CIAA later changed its name to the Central Intercollegiate Athletic Conference.
240.
Negro Football Title Will Be Settled Here, CONST. (Atlanta), Nov. 18, 1913, at 10
(noting Morehouse College and Fisk University to compete for “the colored football
championship of the South”).
241.
1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 5. When it finally was able to join the NCAA, the
conference included Howard University, Lincoln University, Union University, Virginia
Normal and Industrial Institute, Virginia Theological Seminary and College, Shaw
University, and Hampton Institute. 1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 5.
242.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINETEENTH ANNUAL
CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N 10 (1924) [hereinafter 1924
PROC.].
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Carlisle was not a college-level institution, but the athletic skill of its
students, often led to competitions against college teams and led
colleges to recruit its students. When Carlisle students entered
college, some argued that they should be treated as if they had played
collegiate athletics for a year, thus reducing their eligibility, or even
possibly subjecting them to transfer rules requiring them to sit out a
year.243
V. THE “THREAT” OF THE PROFESSIONAL GAME
While the end of the War brought a return to college football, it
also brought a new threat: professional football. Semi-professional
and professional football teams had been around for some time, but
the formation of the American Professional Football Association (later
the “National Football League”) in 1920 was backed by big money and,
thus, introduced a new era. Smaller leagues did not completely
disappear, however. In fact, even the American Legion conducted a
professional football program.244 In response, critics from the NCAA
complained that professionalism was being conducted under the guise
of patriotism.245
Leaders of big time athletic programs at NCAA schools
generally wanted no professionalism of the sport. Of course, there was
some concern that the existence of professional leagues might affect
the amateur spirit at college games or even lead collegians to accept
pay in order to enhance their skills at the college level. Noting that
the only source from which professional teams could pull their players
were collegiate teams, Charles Kennedy argued that the NCAA should
“put themselves on record against the professionalizing of football.”246
But the opposition to professional football was much broader than just
a concern for amateurism. First, there was the social concern that,
irrespective of its effect upon amateur sports, professional athletics
would introduce undesired social evils. But second, and some would
243.
When a Carlisle student entered Syracuse University, the student was treated
as if he had expended a year of eligibility. The NCAA distinguished that case from another
Carlisle student who was enrolled in both Carlisle and nearby Dickinson College noting
that those institutions were in the same town and supplemented each other’s work while
the Syracuse “was without modifying circumstances.” H.A. Peck, 2d Dist. Rep., in 1908
PROC., supra note 20, at 12 (paraphrasing university’s decision); see also 5th Dist. Rep., in
1927 PROC., supra note 90, at 28 (stating that the Fifth District will count Carlisle team
membership against entrance requirements).
244.See S.W. Beyer, 6th Dist. Rep., in 1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 43.
245.
Id.
246.
2d Dist. Rep., in 1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 20.
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say most importantly, was another reason. Some colleges were
steeped in debt obligations that supported stadium building and other
expenses, and were still under great pressure from alumni and the
public to continue their intercollegiate athletic programs. Many
schools feared a frightening financial hit if professional athletics lured
fans and, even worse, star collegiate players, away from the college
game.247 Some individuals no doubt feared for their jobs. It was in the
financial interest of the NCAA, member schools, and the
administrators of intercollegiate athletics to stop professional football.
In 1919, the NCAA adopted a resolution stating that anyone
who participated in a professional game “either during their college
course or after leaving college” would forfeit his college letters.248 In
1921, it organized the College Football Coaches Association—open
solely to coaches at NCAA member schools—which at its first official
meeting issued a resolution condemning the professional game and
vowing to stop it:
Be it hereby resolved that it is the sense of the American Football Coaches
Association that professional football is detrimental to the best interests of
American football and American youth. It is further resolved that football coaches
lend their influence to the discouragement of professional football, and be it further
resolved that football coaches hereby heartily second the policy and stand of the
Western Intercollegiate Conference on professional football, and be it further
resolved, that the coaches recommend that football officials who officiate at
professional football games be not allowed to officiate at college contests.249

As the resolution indicated, the conferences also put their weight
against the professional game.250
That these groups did not consider these actions to stop the
professional game a possible violation of the antitrust laws may be a
reflection of the times. The following year the Supreme Court decided
247.
1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 41, 43, 78, 83 (noting various districts describe
professional teams as recruiting amateurs and had a negative effect upon amateur players,
and expressing dislike for these teams).
248.
Miscellaneous Business, in 1919 PROC., supra note 194, at 55 (emphasis added).
249.
Miscellaneous Business, Football Coaches Ass’n, in 1921 PROC., supra note 75,
at 89; see also 1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 68- 74 (noting membership in association
limited and organization has already made “a good start in expressing opposition to
professional football” as well as other matters).
250.
See e.g., 5th Dist. Rep., in 1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 41 (referring to
“vigorous measures” of conferences to stop professional teams from luring away college
players); S.V. Sanford, 3d Dist. Rep., in 1925 PROC., supra note 104, at 20-24 (stating
Southern conferences will not hire coaches who have engaged in professional games and
will not allow students who have done so to act as officials); 5th Dist. Rep., in 1921 PROC.,
supra note 75, at 27 (Missouri Valley Conference takes similar step); 6th Dist. Rep., in 1921
PROC., supra note 75, at 29 (Southwest conference recommends that members discourage
professional baseball and football playing and the signing of professional contracts).
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the infamous Federal Baseball case, which determined that
professional baseball was not engaged in interstate commerce and
therefore could not be sued under the antitrust laws.251 Many,
including this writer, have argued that the case reflected a view of
baseball (and sports) as not being a true business, i.e., it was a game
and not the type of thing that antitrust laws were intended to affect.
252

The kitchen grew hotter when, at the end of his final collegiate
season, Red Grange signed with a professional team for a reported
$100,000, and Ernie Nevers went pro shortly thereafter.253 These
signings evoked a range of opinions. Some argued that the teamwork
needed in the college program was impossible if athletes were aspiring
to ultimate professional glory. Arguing for the adoption of some sort
of rule, one news editor argued that without one, fans would not know
whether a college player was playing for the love of the game or for
“grand stand glory that will get him a fat contract along about
That writer claimed that the latter
Thanksgiving [D]ay.”254
alternative would lead to a “withering of college enthusiasm” and an
end to the college football spirit.255 However, not all onlookers agreed
that students should be barred from taking professional contracts
after college play. Famed commentator Will Rogers was not alone
when he argued that the sole reason colleges feared the professional
game was that it threatened their ability to make money on the backs
of collegiate players. 256
Some schools used the rise of the professional game and private
control of sports to argue that intercollegiate football involvement
should be increased. In 1921, the reporter for the NCAA’s Ninth

251.
Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs,
259 U.S. 200 (1922).
252.
See W. Burlette Carter, What Makes a “Field” a Field?, 1 VA. J. SPORTS & L.
235, 241 (1999); see also Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, 259 U.S. 200. The Supreme
Court later rejected the logic of Federal Baseball repeatedly, but adhered to it on the
ground of stare decisis. It would take Congressional legislation to finally reverse its
impact. See Curt Flood Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 26(b) (2000).
253.
Hugh Bezdek, in 1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 89 (giving a report by Penn
State Football Coach Hugo Bezdek that at its first meeting the night before the newly
formed coaches association had adopted the resolution); see also Davis J. Walsh, Coaches
Deplore Grange Case but Red Gets Coin, LINCOLN STAR, Dec. 28, 1925, at 6 (discussing
Grange incident).
254.
Walsh, supra note 253, at 6.
255.
Id.
256.
Will Rogers, Red Grange Chose the Better Part, LINCOLN SUNDAY STAR, Dec. 6,
1925, at 4.
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District (the west coast) reported “some difficulty” in controlling the
Rose Bowl games, but noted that rather than a policy of “hands off,”
colleges needed to become intricately involved in regulating such
events or face the possibility that they will fall into the hands of
private enterprise. 257
The NCAA saw the Grange incident as demonstrating the need
for further action. In 1925, it recommended that schools dismiss
anyone who “may be at any time connected in any capacity with
professional football” after September of 1926.258 NCAA President
Palmer Pierce opined that he saw no problem with the development of
both amateur and professional sports, “provided the two classes of
sports can be kept separate.”259 By separate Pierce meant that
student athletes should be discouraged from playing professional
athletics, whether it be during or after graduation.260
Under pressure from the amateur game and its supporters in
January of 1926, the owners of professional football teams met in New
York to discuss how to resolve this dispute with the colleges, the
NCAA and the supporters of their product.261 Eventually, the far
weaker professional leagues agreed not to touch college athletes until
after the athlete’s high school or college class had graduated, whether
or not the athlete himself did.262 This rule was the earliest ancestor of
the notorious “three year” rule that was the center of litigation in
Clarett v. NFL.263 Of course, the rule offered some benefits to the
257.
258.

9th Dist. Rep., in 1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 50.
Evening Session, in 1925 PROC., supra note 104, at 12-13; see also Football
Rules Comm. Rep., in 1925 PROC., supra note 104, at 42-44 (stating professional football
“has departed from its own field” and not only raided college teams but also high school
teams).
259.
Palmer E. Pierce, The Annual Presidential Address, in 1925 PROC., supra note
104, at 85.
260.
Id. at 86 (noting that the number of undergraduates who have started to play
the professional game at the close of their college season is an indication of
professionalism’s negative effect on collegiate football).
261.
Saving College Football, DAILY NORTHWESTERN, Jan. 6, 1926, at 6.
262.
Foster Eaton, “Red” to Play at Yankee Stadium; Illinois Flash Seeks Right to
Direct “Pro” Team at Gotham Park, LINCOLN SUNDAY STAR, Feb. 7, 1926, at 2 (noting
League’s unanimous adoption of rule to fine or revoke charter of any club that negotiated
with college players before graduation); Big Bill Edwards Appointed High Judge of Pro
Football; Will Rule New Organization at 25,000 Per, LIMA NEWS AND TIMES-DEMOCRAT,
Mar. 8, 1926 (noting appointment of William H. Edwards, former captain and coach at
Princeton, to lead American League of Professional Football Players and his act of
inserting into bylaws a rule prohibiting professional teams from touching high school or
college players until the players’ class has graduated from high school or college).
263.
Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 386-87 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
rev’d in part, vacated in part and remanded, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004), cert denied, 125 S.

2006]

THE AGE OF INNOCENCE

265

league, as well. It meant that players who came to them would be
better-developed physically and mentally, without the expense of a
minor league program. It also meant continued good relations with
the NCAA, member schools and conferences. By 1926 an NCAA
committee would report that the professional game did not “loom up
as such a dire menace” as it did in 1925 and would express
appreciation to pro teams for adopting rules that prohibited tampering
with collegiate players.264
VI. THE “THREAT” OF THE MEDIA
Early on, the NCAA leadership was keenly aware of the
media’s potential role in their success. In 1907, President Palmer
Pierce suggested that the NCAA could become “[a] central bureau of
propaganda concerning college athletics” by employing, among other
approaches, “newspaper statements of aims and policies” and
“circulars and other published literature.”265 In 1909, the NCAA’s
president called for greater use of newspapers to get the Association’s
story across to the public and to students.266 Certainly, the NCAA
made sure that reports of its proceedings made their way into local
newspapers.267 Of course, the media had its own mission. Thus, the
relationship in each party’s eyes, was necessary, but troubled.
The print press dominated coverage in the NCAA’s early years.
Newspaper editors angered some NCAA operatives by deciding to
select and announce a “national champion” in football and by their
selection of All-American teams. 268 However, NCAA member schools
Ct. 1728 (2005). Maurice Clarett, then an Ohio State sophomore and a rising college star
with professional aspirations, unsuccessfully challenged the NFL’s three-year rule. Id. at
390-92. He claimed it violated federal antitrust laws and was not subject to the antitrust
labor exemption because it was not, and should have been, the subject of collective
bargaining between the union and the league. Id. Clarett’s complaint charged a horizontal
conspiracy among NFL owners and teams. Id. He did not implicate the NCAA or his
institution in the conspiracy or join them as defendants. Id.
264.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n , Rep. of Special Comm. of Five, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N 60-61
(1926) [hereinafter 1926 PROC.].
265.
1907 PROC., supra note 2, at 27, 31.
266.
Palmer E. Pierce, The Intercollegiate Athletic Ass’n of the United States, in 1909
PROC., supra note 72, at 31.
267.
E.g., Palmer E. Pierce, The Intercollegiate Athletic Ass’n of the United States, in
1908 PROC., supra note 20, at 29.
268.
W.L. Dudley, 3d Dist. Rep., in 1908 PROC., supra note 20, at 13 (complaining
that sporting editors were exhibiting the professional spirit through awarding a
“championship” “to some college, somewhere, by means of a mathematical process which is
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were complicit in these arrangements because their coaches, often
provided information to the press from which the selections were
made.269
As press coverage increased, so did fan appeal, and vice versa.
By the late 1920’s radio made live play-by-play coverage available to
many more fans. In 1928, NBC Radio planned to carry sixteen games,
beginning with Navy and Notre Dame.270 When the athletics board of
the University of Iowa decided to end radio coverage of football games,
claiming that it negatively affected fan attendance, the decision
caused such an uproar that the board reversed themselves
immediately.271
The 1929 Carnegie Commission report on athletics
summarized the prevailing arguments against the sports media.272 It
was argued that media were professionalizing the amateur game by
singling out coaches and athletes for special attention through
interviews, special coverage, or awards. Schools accused the media of
sensationalizing negative sports news, such as deaths and injuries and
resisting attempts to maintain amateurism by whipping up public
opposition to institutional actions. It is hard to say when the media
was merely reporting public opinion or actually whipping it up.
Probably, as today, they were doing a bit of both.
It is clear that, while they did sensationalize at times, the
media also kept NCAA institutions honest by offering a viewpoint that
was different from that packaged by the institutions. In 1909, the
Washington Post conducted a survey that it claimed proved that the
trend among schools was to minimize the dangers of football to avoid
usually ingenious, if not sound”). The University of Michigan library staff has compiled a
history of “championship” designations that date back to 1901. See Bentley Historical
Library, University of Michigan Athletics History, National Championships,
http://www.umich.edu/~bhl/athdept/football/misc/natchamp.htm (last visited Mar. 28,
2006).
269.
WM. R. Laporte, 8th Dist. Rep., in 1925 PROC., supra note 104, at 38 (district
speaker complaining that newspapers were resisting efforts to better athletic programs by
promoting the “spectacular rather than the educational” and asking for advice on how to
handle
bad
publicity);
see
also
Wikipedia,
Walter
Camp,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walter_Camp (last visited Mar. 19, 2006) (biography of Walter
Camp noting that he may have suggested the selection of the first All-American team and
certainly remained involved throughout his career).
270.
16 Big Games to be Covered on N.B.C. Chain, DECATUR HERALD, Oct. 7, 1928,
at 10.
271.
Heavy Protest Restores Radio Football News, TIMES RECORDER, (date and page
unknown).
272.
Howard J. Savage et al., American College Athletics, BULLETIN NO. 23, at 26690 (1929).
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waning support. 273 As noted earlier, Will Rogers’s editorial was also
key among those arguing that schools’ interest in preventing
professional play was primarily financial.274 The media’s reports on
football injuries no doubt spurred the public pressure that led even the
most stubborn to reform. And despite the fact that much majority-run
press denied the contributions of women and minorities, a few papers
gave coverage.275
Certainly, though, the press was not always constructively
critical of intercollegiate athletics. Far more often than it was
witnessed challenging the proponents of commercialization and
exploitation, the media was found in bed with them. Arguably, the
press also facilitated the exploitation of which they complained,
serving up full vials of euphoric media exposure, enough to make an
impressionable
student-athlete forget
about
the
academic
shortcomings that would surely cripple him after the cheering
stopped.
VII. OLYMPICS, PHYSICAL FITNESS, RULES, AND CHAMPIONSHIPS
After the War, the NCAA faced a number of other issues. It
began to take advantage of its new relationship with the government,
lobbying federal and state authorities for support of physical
education in the nation’s schools.276 It formed coalitions with groups
advocating physical fitness, such as the YMCA. It also put its weight
behind the federal Fess-Capper bill that offered federal money to
states to establish physical education programs in schools.277
The NCAA was also intricately involved in the formation of
what ultimately became the U.S. Olympic Committee. After the War,
the federal government strongly pushed amateur athletics groups to
form a single national organization to advance America’s interests in
the Olympics. In 1920, the NCAA agreed to engage in discussions
273.
For Sane Football, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 1909 (claiming trend is for institutional
leaders to minimize game’s dangers).
274.
Will Rogers, Red Grange Chose the Better Part, LINCOLN SUNDAY STAR, Dec. 6,
1925, at 4.
275.
E.B. Henderson, Howard Had Great Team, WASH. POST , Dec. 13, 1908, at 6
(noting Howard’s success despite obstacles and school not receiving its share of news
coverage); see also discussion accompanying notes 226-235 discussing female athletes.
276.
See, e.g., Rep. of Special Comm., in 1920 PROC., supra note 222, at 42-45.
277.
See id.; Comm. on the Fess Capper Bill, in 1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 52-53;
Miscellaneous Business., in 1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 61-63 (National Physical
Education Service thanking NCAA for support and reporting on progress on Fess-Capper
bill).
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with other groups to form such an association, however, the NCAA’s
ongoing feud with the AAU almost got in the way of its involvement.
Eventually, those involved reached a power sharing agreement.278
The NCAA also became a major promulgator of rules and
sponsor of championships. By the end of its first twenty-five years, it
produced rules and/or sponsored national championships in thirteen
sports: Football, Basketball, Baseball, Boxing, Fencing, Gymnastics,
Hockey, Lacrosse, Soccer, Swimming, Track, Volleyball and Wrestling.
VIII. CRACKS IN THE COALITION
In the mid-1920s, the NCAA requested that the Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching conduct an examination
of American intercollegiate athletics programs.279 It seems that
opponents of the growing commercialism in intercollegiate athletics
saw the Carnegie Foundation as a friend whose critiques and
recommendations might provide the kind of wake-up call that they,
themselves, could not accomplish within the organization.280
When it was finally published in 1929, Carnegie Bulletin No.
23 issued a strong indictment of intercollegiate athletics programs,
touching upon every controversy that had plagued the NCAA for its
A NCAA Committee established to study the
first quarter.281
Carnegie Bulletin agreed with much of what Bulletin 23 said.282 But
despite the solidarity of the Committee, the NCAA as a whole was a
house divided.
The contrast in two district approaches revealed the problem
early on. The small New England schools of the First District—
278.
E.g., 1920 PROC., supra note 222, at 9 (voting to participate); Palmer E. Pierce,
Comm. on the Proposed Olympic Ass’n, in 1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 53-61 (complaining
AAU had too much voting power in Olympic Association under constitution and discussing
tensions between two organizations); 1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 61-63 (NCAA deciding
not to participate unless constitution changed); Charles W. Kennedy, Presidential Address,
in 1930 PROC., supra note 24, at 85-88 (noting changes in Olympic Association Constitution
that NCAA was able to secure and NCAA acceptance of invitation to join association).
279.
Palmer E. Pierce, The Annual Presidential Address, in 1925 PROC., supra note
104, at 87-88; Palmer E. Pierce, Presidential Address, in 1926 PROC., supra note 264, at 6970; 1928 PROC., supra note 115, at 13; C.W. Mendell, Rep. of Comm. to Study Carnegie
Found. Bulletin. 23, in 1930 PROC., supra note 24, at 79 (noting report undertaken at
NCAA request).
280.
S.V. Sanford, 3d Dist. Rep., in 1928 PROC., supra note 115, at 31 (for further
reform, NCAA needed to look to outside scholarly groups like Carnegie Foundation).
281.
Savage, supra note 272, at 266-90.
282.
C.W. Mendell, Rep. of Comm. to Study Carnegie Found. Bulletin. 23, in 1930
PROC., supra note 24, at 79-84.
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lacking Harvard, Yale and Princeton—generally supported the move
away from intercollegiate athletics and toward intramurals. In 1907,
the district reported that a majority of its schools were in favor of “a
movement looking toward the restriction of intercollegiate
athletics.”283
By contrast, the Pacific Coast schools in the Ninth District
were dominated by large universities that depended upon
governmental support of their athletics programs and had strong
legislative conferences. Speaking of intercollegiate program growth,
in 1928 the Ninth District’s reporter stated that, “[c]ontrary to the
attitude of some of our Eastern brethren, we are not alarmed by this .
. . .”284 Moreover, the reporter added:
We fail to see a necessary inconsistency between large crowds and clean sport.
As a matter of fact, we believe football attracts to a great extent because of its
cleanliness. We feel that most of the possible evils due to this increased interest
are more than offset by three distinct advantages: First, the creation of a spirit of
loyalty in our own large student bodies; second, the sustaining of the alumni’s
interest in their alma mater; and finally, the awakening of the general public by
their interest in athletics indirectly to a favorable attitude and consideration of
education generally.285

Rather than reducing intercollegiate athletics, the report
noted, the problem was meeting the growing demand for it. The result
was the construction of two collegiate stadiums and over $1,000,000
raised for the construction of a third, and “the construction of more is
threatened by the various municipalities of the West or Pacific
Coast.”286 Not surprisingly, the “Big Ten” schools of the Midwest
shared the Pacific Coast institutions’ point of view regarding
expansion.
While individual educators certainly evidenced differences in
approaches to amateurism, at the end of the day the difference
between institutional approaches to intercollegiate athletics was not
so much a difference in respect for amateurism as it was a reflection of
the geography, history, politics and the culture of the regions that
supported those institutions. Intercollegiate athletics policy did not
spring full-grown, but was the product of compromise between people
with very different visions of the role amateurism should play in
intercollegiate athletics.

283.
284.
285.
286.

H.D. Wild, 1st Dist. Rep., in 1907 PROC., supra note 2, at 7.
Leslie J. Ayer, 9th Dist. Rep., in 1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 49.
Id.
Id.
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Consider, for example, that the West and the Midwest tended
to have large, state supported institutions. Their populations were
spread out over broad expanses with very little mass transportation
between communities and little industry. By contrast, the Eastern
institutions tended to be smaller and closer together with more
privately supported institutions among them.
The populations
surrounding eastern institutions also were denser, and thus able to
support many different types of recreation.
State-supported
institutions had to satisfy governments that provided their funding.
In areas where other forms of recreation were scarce, governments
actively supported and encouraged the development of intercollegiate
athletics because the events were popular with the people, and
governments felt they served a public purpose. Perhaps, under the
circumstances that confronted some of the large West Coast and
Midwestern schools, educators did feel pressure to provide the public
with an alternative to the circus, the prize fight or the gladiatorial
combat, because such other large-scale recreation was not easily
accessible.287 It seems that intercollegiate football first became king in
places where there was not a lot of other big time organized
recreation.
Whatever the cause, the differences among NCAA members so
much frustrated a Committee on Proper Administration of College
Athletics in 1909 that it even proposed a realignment of colleges into
completely separate organizations “according to their ideas,” one for
amateur programs and one for professional.288 Said the Committee,
Those that believe professional athletes may rightly have a place on a college team,
and those that, becoming weary of lying students, see no remedy except to cease
asking questions—let them seek each other in friendly rivalry.
On the other hand those colleges that will have amateur athletics or none – let
them seek their kind. Thus we will have two great national organizations and
between two members of different groups let there be scheduled no athletic
contests of any kind. Let the one group admit to its teams, if it wishes, principally
those who outside of college and school grounds have had training and experience
and become known as experts . . . . Let it throw its teams wide open to
professionals, with only residence and scholarship restrictions, or agonize with the
problem of finding a point between semi-professionalism and wide-open
professionalism, where students when sorely tempted by self-interest will not

287.
See J.R. Angell, The Reconstruction Program for Physical Education in the
Colleges, in 1918 PROC., supra note 204, at 47 (“I do not believe there is any obligation on
the part of the college to furnish the general public with substitutes for the circus, the prize
fight, and the gladiatorial combat.”).
288.
Rep. of the Comm. on Proper Admin. of Athletics, in 1909 PROC., supra note 72,
at 17.
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falsify. Let it welcome the well-developed poor boy, who, to get money to pay for
his education, finds it needful to place his skill on exhibition for wages with
summer baseball teams and let it thus establish conditions which finally and
necessarily restrict membership on its teams to men of like experience, making
college athletics for the amusement rather than the physical training of the many.
Let the amateur group agonize with the problem of the deceitful collegian; let it say
to the man who falsifies his record that he will surely suffer the same penalty as
the man who cheats in examination or is guilty of other dishonesty, namely that he
will be dishonorably dismissed from his institution. One theory or the other would
soon control all the colleges of the land and we would have peace.289

The Committee was percipient in its recognition that the
NCAA could not stand if it ignored the divisions in its own house. At
the December 1930 convention, NCAA President Charles W. Kennedy,
then the president of Princeton University, tried again, calling for
drastic changes in football including the reduction of schedules to not
more than five or six games, an end to spring and summer vacation
practices, and an end to “intersectional or national championships in
football.”290 As to the latter, he said that colleges had no “true or
natural interests” in such games.291
That these comments came from Kennedy is ironic because his
institution, Princeton, was among the football leaders invited to
President Roosevelt’s October 1905 meeting to reform the game, and
among those who formed the first Football Rules Committee. Similar
irony was reflected in the comments of James R. Angell who had then
taken on the presidency at Yale, another Roosevelt invitee and FRE
member:
In the present era of high-powered and somewhat commercialized athletics, it
is difficult to recall that they grew out of the wholly informal sports and games of
college students conducted originally for sheer fun and wholesome exercise, with
no thought whatever of intercollegiate competition, which was a late and relatively
casual outcome of these unorganized domestic amusements.292

The context of these comments is also important. Whether by
fate or by institutional design, Harvard, Yale and Princeton never
regained their status as football’s leaders. The schools of the Big Ten
and Pacific Coast forged ahead with southern schools soon to follow.
It could be said that in such an environment, expressions of disfavor
for intersectional contests were not as costly as they might have been
in years past. And yet, in fairness, both men had been consistent in
289.
290.
291.
292.

Id.
Charles Kennedy, Presidential Address, in 1930 PROC., supra note 24, at 92.
Id. at 92.
James R. Angell, The Familiar Problems of College Athletics, in 1930 PROC.,
supra note 24, at 98 (emphasis added).
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their views throughout their affiliation with NCAA and their rise to
leadership at their institutions and within the NCAA represented a
remarkable shift for those organizations.
By 1932, smaller colleges sought separate discussion meetings
at the NCAA national convention, noting that their concerns differed
substantially from those of larger schools that also tended to have
larger athletic programs.293 Such differences ultimately led the body
to split into three NCAA “Divisions” in the 1970’s, separated largely
by size of athletic program and intercollegiate athletics philosophy.294
Division I schools are those with the largest athletic programs and the
greatest number of sports and athletic scholarships. Division II allows
athletics scholarships, but has fewer and smaller programs. Division
III schools do not offer athletic scholarships and have much smaller
intercollegiate athletics programs.
For some time these divisions were tied together by a
legislative structure that often required the support of all divisions for
major action. But that approach also began to wane, as the NCAA
began to untangle the Divisions from each other by classifying
legislation. However, this was not enough. In 1996, continuing
differences among the divisions led to a historical restructuring effort
that for all practical purposes made the three Divisions autonomous—
and gave the conferences renewed power. The NCAA called its new
plan a “federated” approach. As I have argued elsewhere, by restoring
significant autonomy to the divisions and the conferences, the NCAA
came full circle, looking more like the group that it “severally agree[d]”
it was when it first organized in 1905-06.295
When we examine the status of the original members of the
NCAA, it is easy to see that dissention followed that body through the
years because of key differences in athletics philosophy that were
present even at the body’s inception. Today, seventeen of the original
thirty-eight members are Division I schools and of those, ten have
football programs classified as Division IA, the most competitive

293.
See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, Athletic Budgets, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE TWENTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES 3-4 (1932) [hereinafter 1932 PROC.] (noting the

adoption of the roundtable format in 1931 and that smaller colleges sought separate
meetings for the 1932 gathering).
294.
See Historical Outline of Multidivision Classification, http://www1.ncaa.org/
eprise/main/administrator/Historical_Outline.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2006) (according to
the NCAA, this divisional split occurred in 1973).
295.
See Carter, Student Athlete, supra note 36, at 9.
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football classification.296 The remaining twenty-one original schools
fall into Division III. Interestingly, none of the original members of
the NCAA or the FRC are represented in the middle position of
Division II. Of the members of the FRC, all except the University of
Chicago (Division III) have Division I programs, and the U.S. Naval
Academy’s football program is further classified in the most
competitive I-A subdivision.297
IX. REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST AND A CALL FOR A NEW AMATEURISM
Chancellor McCracken died in 1918, well before the NCAA
celebrated its twenty-fifth birthday.298 Walter Camp passed in
1925.299 But before his passing, each surely knew he had been a part
of a major undertaking.
What would the early leaders of the NCAA think of
intercollegiate athletics and the NCAA today? The founders would
likely be very proud to see that their dream of a nationally-recognized
NCAA has become a reality. Virtually every four-year college in the
country is now a member. By legislating the terms of the eligibility
for intercollegiate sport, NCAA regulations reach not only more than
360,000 current collegiate student-athletes, but also prospective
student athletes. It sponsors eighty-eight national championships in
twenty-three sports with men’s and women’s divisions in most of
them. It also is a leading promulgator of amateur sports rules.
The early effort to create a “central bureau of propaganda”300
has evolved into a Washington, D.C. lobbying office, a
media/publishing department and a General Counsel’s office. The use

296.
See List of Active NCAA Member Institutions, http://www.ncaa.org/conferences/
index.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
297.
When this article went to press, the original NCAA members with Division I
programs and IA football were U. Colorado (Boulder), Univ. of Miami (Ohio), Univ. of
Minnesota, Univ. of Missouri, Univ. of Nebraska, Univ. of North Carolina (Chapel Hill),
Syracuse, Rutgers Univ. (New Brunswick), the U.S. Military Academy and Vanderbilt
Univ. The other original members in Division I (but not IA football) were Bucknell,
Colgate Univ. George Washington Univ., Lehigh, Niagara, U. Penn. and Seton Hall U. All
other original members have Division III programs. See id.
298.
See New Business, in 1918 PROC., supra note 204, at 32 (providing comments
about McCracken’s death in tribute).
299.
See Evening Session, in 1925 PROC., supra note 104, at 12 (resolution
memorializing Camp); E.K. Hall, Memorial to Walter Camp, in 1925 PROC., supra note 104,
at 58-61.
300.
See 1907 PROC., supra note 2, at 27, 31.
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of television, radio and the internet now allows the NCAA and its
members to spread their messages to millions.301
Most founders would be surprised that the doors of opportunity
have been opened for women and minorities, although there is work
still to be done. Social changes would also likely stun many of them.
Earlier ideas of unsportsmanlike conduct have yielded to more flexible
views of player and fan behavior. In stark contrast to the days of
encouraging abstinence from alcohol and Prohibition, institutions now
sponsor and profit from the sale of alcohol at games. Scantily clad
female cheerleaders and crowd histrionics would likely confound the
founders.
No doubt all founders would be pleased that physical fitness
education and opportunities are now available to all students at all
educational levels. They would celebrate America’s continuing success
in the Olympic Games. Likely, they would not be surprised that
different NCAA schools have gone different ways with their athletic
programs. Some, however, would be surprised that institutions with
such divergent approaches still occupy the same body. Amateurists
firmly believed that amateurism and professionalism could not live
together in the same house, and they would view many aspects of
today’s programs as “professional” in nature.
That point brings us to the most significant difference the
founders would note. They would be surprised at what qualifies as an
“amateur” program today, particularly in revenue-producing sports.
Today, revenues from television and radio contracts for coverage of
NCAA championships are mind-boggling.302 Most of that money is
channeled back to Division I schools, which in turn pump it back into
their athletic programs. In 2005, the NCAA licensed twenty-eight

301.
See Carter, Student Athlete, supra note 36 (providing an overview of the
NCAA’s work).
302.
In 1999 the NCAA signed an 11-year, 6 billion-dollar-plus agreement with CBS
Sports averaging 545 million per year for coverage of men’s basketball and other sports
starting with 2002-03 academic year). The “bundled” rights deal included year-round
promotion of NCAA championships as well as cable, internet, radio, championship program
publication and other rights. Editor’s Note, THE DIVISION 11 UPDATE (NCAA Division 11
Governance Staff, Indianapolis, IN), Dec. 1999, at 1; see also Division 1 Revenue
Distribution Chart, NCAA NEWS, Sept. 27, 2004 (noting distribution of more than
$280,000,000 dollars); Division I Revenue Distribution Chart, NCAA NEWS, Sept. 29, 2003,
available at http://www.ncaa.org/news/2003/20030929
/div1/4020n12.html (noting distribution of more than $260,000,000 dollars); Press Release,
NCAA Reaches Rights Agreement with CBS Sports, (Nov. 18, 1999), available at
http://www.ncaa.org/releases/champother/1999/1999111801co.htm.
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post-season football “bowl” games.303 Those bowls, conducted largely
through the holiday season, brought their participating conferences
and teams millions. “Corporate partners” pay millions for advertising
rights and the opportunity to say that they are affiliated with the
NCAA, conferences, and member schools.
Athletic apparel
manufacturers do the same. Conferences and powerhouse schools also
negotiate their own television, radio, and marketing contracts.304 At
every level, the “property” of intercollegiate athletics that is for sale is
not merely the games, but also the student-athletes themselves. They
are shuttled to and from coach’s shows and media circuses.305 Calls
for institutions to cease requiring student athletes to sport the labels
of corporate sponsors on their uniforms have fallen on deaf ears. 306
Multi-million dollar media contracts for the coverage of games and
championships would astound early amateurists.307 They would view
such contracts as sacrilegious profiteering.
Courts across the country fondly refer to amateurism as a
“tradition.” In 1984, in NCAA v. Board of Regents the U.S. Supreme
Court referenced “a revered tradition of amateurism in college sports,”
and said the NCAA plays a “critical” role in maintaining that
tradition. 308 But a “tradition” is a pattern or practice that doesn’t
change dramatically over time.309 This look at the NCAA’s first
303.
See Number of Bowl Games Remains At 28 for 2005-06 Season, NCAA NEWS,
MAY 9, 2005. Since the U.S. Supreme Court decision in NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468
U.S. 85 (1984),the money from football has bypassed the NCAA and gone directly to
conferences and participants. See Kay Hawes, Gridiron Gridlock: Landmark Lawsuit
Caused Football Television to Change Channels, NCAA NEWS, Dec. 6, 1999 available at
http://www.ncaa.org/news/1999/19991206/active/
3625n36.html (noting contract for year case was decided would have been worth 73.6
million to NCAA and members).
304.
See Press Release, Big Ten Conference, Big Ten Announces Contract Extension
with CBS (Dec. 21, 2004), available at http://bigten.collegesports.com/
sports/m-baskbl/spec-rel/122104aac.html (referencing multiyear agreement with CBS for
coverage through 2009-10).
305.
For more on the evolution of NCAA media rules as they relate to studentathletes, see Carter, Student Athlete, supra note 36 (noting efforts to allow student-athletes
greater freedoms to write and participate in school plays resulted instead in the creation of
opportunities for additional exploitation by coaches and media).
306.
See Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, A Call to Action:
Reconnecting College Sports and Higher Education (2001), available at
http://www.knightcommission.org/about/a_call_to_action_a_call_to_action/.
307.
The invention of television for public use had not yet been perfected by 1931. In
1938, the University of Pennsylvania would become the first institution to televise publicly
a collegiate game. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 89 (1984).
308.
Id. at 120.
309.
See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.mw.com/
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quarter of a century shows that the amateurism of the NCAA’s
inception is starkly different from what intercollegiate athletics offers
now.
A. A New Amateurism
Today it is too often forgotten that, historically, “amateur” was
meant to define not merely how the student-athlete approached
athletics, but also how a school conducted its intercollegiate athletics
programs. It was considered wrong—and a sign of professionalism—
to use student-athletes for advertising purposes.
Amateurists
abhorred any funding structure for athletics that subjected the
institution’s programs to outside control. They would frown upon
stadium luxury boxes, extensive post-season play, institutions inviting
media coverage of their games and students, or corporate sponsorships
in exchange for financial gain.
A far different reality prevails today than in the period from
1906-1931. The overwhelming number of NCAA programs—certainly
most in Divisions I and II—could never pass the litmus tests for
amateurism found in Angell’s 1918 “Confession of Faith.”310 That new
reality requires a reassessment of the role of amateurism in our legal
treatment of intercollegiate athletics. It requires “a new amateurism.”
Defining the new amateurism requires the unraveling of three
ideas that have become a tangled mush in recent decades: (1)
amateurism, (2) education, and (3) intercollegiate athletics.
Historically, amateurism was a principle that stood apart from
education. Indeed, educational institutions did not recognize athletics
activities as being a part of their mission. Campus athletics first
emerged as mere student games. Amateurism was a way of life, and
even a person who was not in school could be an amateur.
Institutions took control of athletics away from students
because they feared that their students were not adhering to the
amateur spirit; because they feared that athletics might overtake the
college campus; because they had safety concerns; and, cynics might
say, because they saw a golden financial opportunity. Thus, the
relationship between amateurism in athletics on the one hand and
education on the other was born.
Educators who supported
intercollegiate athletics then decided that, to control athletics, they
had to ensure that athletic programs were integrated into their
dictionary/tradition (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
310.
See discussion supra Part III.C.
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educational programs.
That integration was not necessary for
amateurism; it existed in many non-educational environments.
Instead, integration was deemed necessary by those who wanted
amateur athletics to continue in an educational environment.
Significantly, institutions absolutely did not want the private sector to
take over athletics, particularly after they had committed to millions
in debt or come to rely upon the lucrative receipts of their programs.
As discussed, the institutions, and the NCAA itself, faced
internal struggles. The promised integration never occurred because
of opposition within the institution to recognizing athletics and
funding it in the general budget. Essentially, what resulted was a
bifurcated university wherein athletics was left to find its own
funding, and coaches were left to fashion their own means of job
security.311
The third concept that needs unraveling is “intercollegiate
athletics.” Intercollegiate athletics is merely competition between
collegiate institutions; the inadvertent result of the student-run
games, later taken over by the colleges and universities.
Intercollegiate athletics are not inherently either amateur or
educational. They may, in fact, be run in a professional and/or noneducational manner. 312
Confusion of these three terms—or a merging of them, really—
has led courts to offer muddled guidance in cases involving challenges
to intercollegiate athletics. An example of this confusion is found in
the Supreme Court’s famous decision in NCAA v. Board of Regents.
That case revolved around a television plan adopted by the NCAA in
the 1950’s, which essentially required NCAA schools to jointly
negotiate contracts for television coverage. One of the many goals of
the plan was to ensure that smaller schools that could not command
their own contracts got a piece of the pie. Another was to exercise
controls on television broadcasts to avoid feared drops in attendance.
Schools with larger programs (and the power to negotiate on
their own) resisted the plan and brought an action claiming that the
plan violated the Sherman Antitrust Act, because it restrained the
rights of schools to offer their product and consumers to buy it. The

311.
See discussion supra Part II.C-E; Carter, In Loco Parentis, supra note 22, at
882-89 (discussing the bifurcated institution).
312.
Thus, more than a few have suggested that so called “big time” athletic
programs should be spun off into what is effectively a minor league or semi-professional
program. See discussion infra Part IX.C (describing Division I’s plan to separate from the
NCAA).
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Supreme Court agreed. After noting the “critical role” that the NCAA
plays in the maintenance of “a revered tradition of amateurism in
college sports,” 313 the court’s opinion then muddied the waters by
merging the notions of amateurism, education and intercollegiate
athletics.
There can be no question but that [the NCAA] needs ample latitude to play [its]
role, or that the preservation of the student-athlete in higher education adds
richness and diversity to intercollegiate athletics and is entirely consistent with
the goals of the Sherman Act. But consistent with the Sherman Act, the role of the
NCAA must be to preserve a tradition that might otherwise die; rules that restrict
output are hardly consistent with this role. Today we hold only that the record
supports the District Court’s conclusion that by curtailing output and blunting the
ability of member institutions to respond to consumer preference, the NCAA has
restricted rather than enhanced the place of intercollegiate athletics in the
Nation’s life.314

The final paragraph of the opinion began with a reference to “a
revered tradition of amateurism.”315 It then said that “the role of the
NCAA must be to preserve a tradition that might otherwise die.”316 It
concluded that “rules that restrict output” would not be “consistent
with this role,” and that the NCAA has “restricted rather than
enhanced the place of intercollegiate athletics in the Nation’s life”.317
What is the “tradition” the court is referencing? A tradition of
amateurism? A tradition of intercollegiate athletics? A tradition of
preservation of the student-athlete in higher education? 318 Here, in
speaking of tradition, the court merges the concepts of amateurism,
education and intercollegiate athletics, treating them as if they are
essentially the same thing. Historically they were not, and they are
not now. Moreover, contrary to traditional amateurism, the court
seemed to look outside the institution—speaking of the role of
intercollegiate athletics “in the Nation’s life” and the right of
consumer access to the product—rather than focusing upon the role of
intercollegiate athletics inside respective institutions, or even among
them.

313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984).
Id.
Id. at 120.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Gary Roberts, The NCAA, Antitrust and Consumer Welfare, 70 TUL. L.
REV. 2631, 2635 n.12 (1996) (pointing out how the Court failed to identify any particular
rules that it considered to promote amateurism or academic values but merely assumed
these traits).
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Early amateurists would say that an amateur program should
be assessed by its relevance to the undergraduate student body, not to
outsiders. Indirectly, the public would benefit from this internal focus
because, according to amateurists, this focus preserved the
educational mission. The problem may be that the court embraces a
narrow view of amateurism, one that does not address institutional
commercialism, but rather one that focuses primarily on rules that
keep the student athlete an integral part of the institution.319 Thus, it
seems, while the Supreme Court used the language of amateurism to
describe the NCAA’s role, the court actually ended up treating bigtime intercollegiate athletics as if they were a professional or semiprofessional programs.
The dissent in Board of Regents recognized this latter point,
complaining that the majority erred “in treating intercollegiate
athletics under the NCAA’s control as a purely commercial venture in
which colleges and universities participate solely, or even primarily, in
the pursuit of profits.”320 Chastising the majority for failing to note
the non-economic benefits of the plan, the dissent said, “the plan
fosters the goal of amateurism by spreading revenues among various
schools
and
reducing
the
financial
incentives
toward
professionalism.”321
The problem with the dissent’s point of view is that traditional
amateurism does not embrace spreading commercial wealth from
television contracts, because it rejects the very notion of such lucrative
television contracts in the first place. Moreover, the wealth gained
from such contracts is not today used, in any significant measure, to
promote traditional academic programs for the larger student body.
Instead, most of that wealth goes back into those schools’ athletic
319.
NCAA, 468 U.S. at 120. No doubt the court was lured into this thinking by the
NCAA’s own statement of its fundamental policy and its principle of amateurism. That
fundamental policy states:
The competitive athletics programs of member institutions are designed to be a
vital part of the educational system. A basic purpose of this Association is to
maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program
and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a
clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional
sports.
NCAA CONST. art. 1, § 1.3.1, in 2005-2006 DIVISION I MANUAL, at 1, available at
http://www.ncaa.org/library/membership/division_i_manual/2005-06/
200506_d1_manual.pdf [hereinafter DIVISION I MANUAL]. However, as I have argued
elsewhere, even that statement has changed over the years. See Carter, Student Athlete,
supra note 36, at 70-71.
320.
NCAA, 468 U.S. at 121 (White, J., dissenting).
321.
Id. at 135.
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programs to fund more stadiums, higher paid coaches and more
commercialism. Even that portion of the money that goes to academic
enhancement programs benefits student-athletes, not the general
student body. It even could be argued that student athletes are in
need of such programs primarily because the rigorous schedule of
intercollegiate athletics does not allow them to be ordinary
students,322 or that such athlete-only programs are a poor substitute
for the learning that can come through the diversity presented in
general student body settings. Traditional amateurism’s theory of
“give everyone a chance” cannot be imported properly to justify the
spreading of wealth generated by commercial activities in
intercollegiate athletics that are themselves inconsistent with
amateurism. So the outcome of Board of Regents was right; the
reasoning was wrong.
In case after case, courts and lawmakers have put a thumb on
the scale for intercollegiate athletics and its regulators on the ground
that intercollegiate athletics is deemed “amateur” or “educational.”
Thus, it is important to ask, “What are the contours of modern
amateurism?” What does an “educational” intercollegiate athletics
program look like? The complete answer would surely require another
article, but some essentials come to mind.
First, historically, amateurism defined not merely student
behavior, but also how an institution was to run its program.
Increasingly, however, the applicability of amateurism’s tenets to
program operations in intercollegiate athletics seems to be forgotten.
Too often, amateurism is deemed accomplished when a program
emphasizes academic requirements and “no pay for play” for studentathletes. Historically, amateurism was far more than that. 323

322.
323.

See, e.g., Carter, Student Athlete, supra note 36, at 20.
The NCAA’s Constitution now has sixteen specific principles for the conduct of
intercollegiate athletics. “The Principle of Amateurism,” focuses primarily on shaping the
student’s motivation to play sports and refers to protecting the student athlete from
commercial exploitation. It thus follows the old in loco parentis model by assuming that
that exploitation will come from outside. The principle states:
Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their
participation should be motivated primarily by education and by the physical,
mental and social benefits to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate
athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from
exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises.
NCAA CONST. art. 2, § 2.9, in DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 319. Similarly, the NCAA
constitution uses the term “amateurism” in connection with eligibility rules. See id. art. 1,
§ 1.2. While the NCAA has many principles relating to how the institution should conduct
its intercollegiate athletic programs, they are not described in terms of amateurism.

2006]

THE AGE OF INNOCENCE

281

A proper yardstick for modern amateurism would focus on
program and policies beyond academics and eligibility, ensuring that
the motivation for all policies are consistent with amateurism.
Indeed, an institution may have an amateur approach with respect to
one matter and a professional approach with respect to another
matter. For example, an institution may impose academic standards
on student-athletes because it has the political power to do so. At the
same time, that institution could require student-athletes to engage in
substantial seasonal, vacation and postseason practice and play;
require the student-athlete to sport favored athletic apparel; trot the
student-athlete out to the media; fail to satisfy the student-athlete’s
full financial need because of concerns of competitive parity; and, in
the process, reap millions. Academic standards are consistent with
amateurism because they advance an interest in keeping the athlete
integrated into the student body, and, thus, athletics remains an
avocation as required under an amateur model. However, post-season
or vacation play are hard to fit into athletics as an avocation model.
Athletics policies that merely promote parity and ignore student
athlete need, or that are driven by the commercial value of the sport to
those administering it also are inconsistent with an amateurism
model.
For these reasons, in this highly commercial environment of
intercollegiate athletics, before putting a thumb on the scales, courts
must insist that amateurism flow throughout the program. When
individual policies are challenged, they must determine that those
particular policies have an amateurism motivation. In other words,
professional programs should not be able to piggyback on amateur
policies or a tradition of amateurism that they do not embrace.
Second, an amateur program must have limits on
commercialism. Unlike the days of the early NCAA, educational
institutions today regularly engage in commercial activity that is not
directly related to the educational mission.324 For example, they own

324.
The operation of intercollegiate athletics programs, particularly the post-season
bowls, has raised interesting issues of whether the operations should be subject to the
unrelated business income tax. Exempt organizations may be subject to tax on income
derived from operations not directly related to their exempt purpose. Congress has saved
post-season intercollegiate athletics for now, but the debate is ongoing. A new vision of
amateurism is very relevant to that discussion. See, e.g., Eric Guruli, Commerciality of
College Sports: Should the IRS Intercept?, 12 SPORTS LAW. J. 43 (2005); Richard L. Kaplan,
Intercollegiate Athletics and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1430
(1980); James L. Musselmann, Recent Tax Issues Regarding Professional and Amateur
Sports, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 195 (2003).
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commercial real estate and rent it to the general public. They rent
their campus buildings to outsiders for a fee. But those activities
differ in two important respects from intercollegiate athletics. First,
the income from such activities generally is available to the institution
as a whole and supports further broad educational endeavors. Second,
those transactions tend to sell only physical property. Intercollegiate
athletics, under an umbrella of amateurism, puts the intellectual
assets of an institution—its students and teachers—up for sale.
For this reason, rank commercialism in the guise of amateur
athletics is particularly dangerous. Commercialism should be strictly
limited in amateur programs run by educational institutions,
primarily because commercialism creates a dangerous conflict of
interest between student and institution. Thus, the author’s beef with
the NCAA in Board of Regents: the NCAA merely sought to cut the
commercial pie into more slices, not to require schools to push away
from the table. Amateur programs impose significant limits on
student-athlete rights under the theory that the institution will
protect the welfare of the athlete. On that same theory, courts and
lawmakers have granted schools leeway and upheld restrictions on
student-athlete behavior. If an institution is to take full advantage of
commercialism, there is really no reason why student athletes should
not be paid to play or even why they should not be represented by
unions. Indeed, an argument could be made that it is necessary that
they have outside representation, given the conflicted nature of the
institution.325
Another important aspect of a modern amateur model in the
context of education is the integration of intercollegiate athletics and
the student-athlete into the fabric of the institution. Where programs
are concerned, the most significant difficulty here is financial
integration. Today, financial integration of intercollegiate athletics
programs is allegedly accomplished by requiring institutional CEO’s to
be responsible for budget approval and expenditures, and requiring
that athletics be subject to the “normal” budgetary operations of the
college or university.326 That is not enough. It should mean that
325.
See generally Carter, In Loco Parentis, supra note 22 (arguing for a nonprofit
organization to represent student athletes).
326.
See, e.g., NCAA CONST. art. 6, § 6.2, DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 319
(requiring CEOs to approve budget, requiring athletics to be subject to institution’s
“normal” budgeting procedures, and requiring independent auditor.); see also id. art. 12, §
12.6.1.4 (allowing institution to receive money from professional sports organization for
support of general fund, general scholarship fund, or as part of a “reciprocal marketing
relationship”).
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institutional budgets reflect athletic income and expenditures, along
with other income and expenditures. Moreover, financial integration
should mean that some significant portion of the income from
intercollegiate athletics goes to support general institutional
operations. This is the minimum gift that intercollegiate athletics can
make to institutions that support it; by allowing it to use its name and
goodwill, its grounds, its buildings, its students, its administrative
structure, its security apparatus, and, indeed, by guaranteeing its
debts.
Integration also means integration of the student-athlete into
the general student body. Of course, it means the athlete should be
required to satisfy minimum academic standards. But it also means
that the time commitment required by athletics—practice, playing and
travel—should be such that the goal of academic success, not just
minimum success, can reasonably be achieved. It means that playing
and practice seasons should not extend significantly beyond the
academic year. As discussed elsewhere, in contrast to the dominant
image of student-athletes as privileged, in fact, student-athletes stood
on the fringes of the revolution in rights that affected most in the
general student body after the Vietnam War. In big time programs,
they exist apart, in one side of a bifurcated institution, subject to the
whims of a small group of individuals with the power to determine
their futures.327 The NCAA has rightly given attention to ensuring
that institutions conform to academic standards in student athlete
admissions. However, there is far more. Vestiges of the broken stool
of in loco parentis328 still place student-athletes in precarious
positions, where policies applicable to them are a function of their
commercial value to the program, rather than a function of
amateurism and educational considerations. Grievance procedures
available to the student-athlete are not the same as those afforded the
327.
328.

See, e.g., Carter, In Loco Parentis, supra note 22, at 879-82.
I have elsewhere described in loco parentis as a three legged stool: (1) control;
(2) student welfare; and (3) judicial and legislative deference. See id. at 859.
The control leg permitted the institution to place broad controls on student
behavior. . . . Balancing the control leg was the welfare leg. It provided
justification for the controls by positing that the controls were needed to protect
the student’s welfare . . . . Of course, conceptions of student welfare were
controlled by the assumption that students were infants with no independent
rights. . . . Finally, the deference leg gave the doctrine its teeth . . . .
Id. I have argued that the student welfare leg of that stool has been broken, creating an
imbalance. See id. 891-92. Despite the demise of in loco parentis in matters involving the
general student body, it continues in a perverted fashion in matters involving student
athletes. Id.
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ordinary student. Still, institutions extract professional commitments
from student-athletes under the guise of amateurism.
That brings us to another important aspect of an amateur
program in the context of education. Such a program protects the
welfare of its student-athletes. Here again, commercialism is key.
Commercialism places the institution at odds with the studentathlete, often leading the institution to choose pay-dirt over student
athlete needs. As stated elsewhere,
[T]he alleged parent (the institution) continues to exercise broad controls over
the child (the student athlete) and yet the parent is unable to fulfill its
responsibilities in protecting the welfare of the alleged child because the parent
has an overwhelming financial interest in exploiting the child’s talents. Indeed,
like the greedy parents of a financially-valuable child actor, institutions have
consistently pushed their charges onto more and more national stages in pursuit of
greater and greater financial returns, all the while insisting that their charges
cannot handle greater independence.329

Finally, an amateur intercollegiate athletics program in the
context of education should be transparent. The legal benefits athletic
programs gain from the amateur label are a gift from the public. No
group should be allowed to insist on these benefits and also insist that
its operations be closeted from the public. The only way to unspin the
spin of a bureau of propaganda is to have information on how it
operates and what factors went into decisions.
Fashioning a new amateurism that focuses upon the
motivation behind policies should not be overly burdensome to the
court. Indeed, investigation into the purposes behind policies occurs
now. In Board of Regents, the lawyers and the court did substantial
investigation into the reasoning behind the television plan at issue.
But the court should have assessed whether or not the television plan
promoted amateurism. I have suggested that it did not. The mere
promotion of intercollegiate athletics competition without more should
not justify special treatment historically afforded to amateur
programs.
B. Is Amateurism Outdated?
Is “amateurism” an outdated concept? Today Olympic athletes
have corporate sponsors who support their training.
Athletic
scholarships are, essentially, pay for play, although some might argue
not enough. Student-athletes at NCAA schools may keep the cash
prizes they receive for medaling at the Olympic games. Student329.

Carter, In Loco Parentis, supra note 22, at 853.
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athletes may be a professional in one sport, but an amateur in
another, although their right to income from professional activity is
limited.330 Intercollegiate athletics programs make millions upon
millions, and the public cannot seem to get enough.
Clearly too, some of the social assumptions that supported
traditional amateurism are outdated. Consider, for example, historical
objections to athletically-based financial aid including scholarships
and meals. Certainly, opponents feared that such “pay” would affect
the athlete’s approach to the game, and they feared that outsiders who
provided such scholarships would then have the power to determine
the course of the institution. But there were at least four other social
objections driving the opposition to athletically-related aid in those
days. First, many believed that the only appropriate basis for
scholarships was superior academic performance in a liberal arts
program.331 They opposed scholarships based upon any other ground,
including need. Today, while minimum academic standards apply,
scholarships are offered on a whole host of grounds. Second, as
discussed earlier, professionalism—even outside of the college or
university—was viewed as a social evil to be eradicated, thus, the
slightest movement away from pure amateurism was deemed
offensive. Today, while society still seems to wish to respect the line
between amateurism and professionalism, society’s view of
professionalism is more measured. Thus, social mores today don’t
justify a flat out opposition to athletically-related aid on
professionalism grounds. Third, some amateurists had biases against
the lower classes that were more likely to pay for play because they
had financial need.332 Modern society rejects such class biases as a
basis for policy. Fourth, some opposed intercollegiate athletics in
general, and thus, athletically-related aid, for they knew that without
such aid, intercollegiate athletics could not grow. Today, society has
fully embraced intercollegiate athletics, properly conducted, as a social
good.
On the other hand, athletically-related aid in today’s highly
commercial context raises new problems. As the Knight Commission
has noted, there is a potential for a negative dynamic between
330.
NCAA CONST. art. 12, § 12.1.1.1.4.3.1-2, in DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 319
(stating that a student-athlete may accept “Operation Gold” grant from U.S. Olympic
Committee); Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (restricting endorsement
opportunities of student athlete who was a professional in one sport and an amateur in
another).
331.
W. Burlette Carter, Reconstructing Langdell, 32 GA. L. REV. 1, 73-74 (1997).
332.
See text accompanying note 101.
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student-athlete and coach when the student is so dependent upon the
coach for the continuance of his or her education. Moreover, if the
continuance of a scholarship is based upon student athletic
performance, there is reason to fear that the student-athlete will be
inclined to put athletics first. For this reason, the Commission and
others have urged needs-based scholarships in amateur programs.333
It certainly seems right that in a new amateurism model,
student-athletes who can qualify based on need should receive at least
a substantial portion of their financial aid on that basis. One could
imagine a more generous needs test for those playing intercollegiate
athletics, given the fact that, by virtue of their commitment, studentathletes have far less time for outside work than other students.
However, athletic performance as one of several bases for aid is not
wholly objectionable, given that institutions now allow aid based upon
a wide range of issues, including the mere fact that the donor and the
recipient are from the same state. The problem lies in how such aid is
determined and delivered. Too often professionalism has crept into
financial aid issues as student-athlete financial aid has gotten tangled
up with issues of competitive parity. For example, School X wanted
restrictions on scholarships so that School Y could not outbid it for
student-athletes. In the midst of these arguments, student-athletes
with need suffered. But it seems that athletics as a basis for
scholarships is not wholly objectionable in a modern scheme, so long
as the source of the funding is under the control of the CEO, and an
objective method of distributing the scholarships can be found.334
Those who claim that big-time intercollegiate athletics are still
“amateur” athletics will no doubt assert that athletics is itself
educational. But as argued earlier, athletics is not inherently
educational, no more than requiring students to wash a professor’s car
once a week is inherently educational. Students will derive physical
benefits from both exercises. In both cases, they will learn a skill that
theoretically could some day earn them money. Like athletics, group
car washing takes teamwork. But these attributes, without more, do
not make athletics or car washing an education. Athletics is only
educational if it is conducted in an educational way, in an educational
context with educational standards. Post-season bowl games that
teach student-athletes that practicing and playing during holidays is
more important than time with family at home are of questionable
333.
334.

See Knight Commission, supra note 306.
One option might be to make all athletically based aid the same dollar amount
for all student-athletes who do not meet a need-based, academic or other test.
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educational value.335 Lessons are no doubt learned, but they are not
the ones educational institutions should be teaching.
C. The Future of Intercollegiate Athletics: Amateurism or
Professionalism?
Early, amateurists felt that professionalism and amateurism
could not live in the same house.336 Yet, in intercollegiate athletics
today professional and amateur approaches essentially share the same
living space. Certainly, the Restructuring that occurred in 1996 and
1997 has altered the landscape a bit. But Restructuring was triggered
by a threat from Division I institutions that they leave the NCAA if
they were not given more autonomy to determine their own programs,
and to exploit their commercial potential and the benefit of the
But as discussed
revenues that their programs produced.337
elsewhere, Restructuring put amateurism at greater risk than before,
because it allowed rank commercialism and professionalism to exist
openly, even as those administering such professional programs
reaped the legal benefits of an amateur program classification.
Essentially, to save its body, the NCAA had to sell its soul.338
Likely, we have today some programs that could still pass a
modern test as an amateur program in an educational context. The
obvious place to look is Division III. But the truth is that what we
have in America today are three types of professional programs: major
league professional, minor league professional and collegiate league

335.
In the 2005 holiday season, many teams chose to take their student athletes on
the road to prepare for prestigious bowl games rather than having them spend time at
home with families. Families are sometimes quieted by perks that allow them to come
along and the belief that such trips are necessary for their son to secure a professional
sports career. Potentially negative press is staved off by photo shoots showing studentathletes participate in some charity event. See, e.g., Elton Alexander, Getsy glad he’s not
home for Christmas; Akron QB happy to be in Motor City, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Dec.
20, 2005, at D1; Furman Bisher, College athletics has found financial trough, lost its way,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 14, 2005, at B2 (noting earlier resistance to bowl games on
Christmas day gave way to desires for financial gain).
336.
See discussion supra Part II.A.
337.
See Carter, Student Athlete, supra note 36, at 49-51, 50 n.164 (discussing
Division I’s threat to leave if it did not receive more autonomy).
338.
Id. at 49-51; see also Knight Commission, supra note 306 (expressing fear that
more and more colleges are moving toward commercialism and a professional model) (last
visited March 21, 2006); Gary T. Brown, Members Reflect on Efforts to Federate Governance
10 Years Ago, NCAA NEWS, Jan. 1, 2006.

288 VANDERBILT J. OF ENTERTAINMENT AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 8:2:211

professional.339 Some commentators have suggested that these big
time programs, at least Division I-A football and Division I basketball,
should spin off and separate from their universities. The plans range
from those in which the university maintains control to those in which
they do not. The Knight Commission has strongly opposed such spinoffs, arguing that the result will be unsportsmanlike and unethical
conduct, and a loss of academic integrity.340 Instead, they have
suggested that the NFL and NBA create a minor league for those who
do not want to go to college. But why would the professionals do that
when a minor league is provided for free?341
A partial spin-off from educational institutions, with the
benefits of still claiming amateur status and an educational mission,
would greatly exacerbate the existing problems, allowing even greater
commercialism and more unmonitored exploitation of studentatheletes and educational resources. On the other hand, if there is a
corporate separation of the big league collegiate programs from their
educational institutions—even in a parent-subsidiary sense but with a
separate board and rules to respect the corporate veil—the true cost of
athletics would then be realized. These new entities supervising
intercollegiate athletics would have to compensate the universities for
the services that intercollegiate athletics now take for granted;
including, first and foremost, the use of the university name, but also
the use of space, security, and other assets previously mentioned.
That compensation would flow to the general student body.
Such a separation would remove the guise of amateurism.
There would then be no objection to unions for student-athletes to
represent players and negotiate adequate pay and workplace
conditions. Playing rules could require students to carry at least a
minimum number of hours at the institution and limit the time
allowed to achieve a degree. Because the entities would be corporately
separated from the university, they would have fewer opportunities to
pressure institutions into academic compromises.
Some might
initially object to an institution blatantly renting out its name, but
then, that is exactly what is occurring today in corporate sponsorship
and advertising deals.

339.
I must leave to another day the broader implications of this conclusion, but the
claim that college sports are professional has been made by many commentators before,
although perhaps not in this way.
340.
See, Knight Commission, supra note 306.
341.
See, e.g., id.
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Whatever the ultimate model, while the NCAA and its member
schools can help with this process of defining the new amateurism,
they cannot be its sole architects. While they bring a wealth of
knowledge to the table, their commercial investment in athletics also
creates inevitable conflicts of interest.
One question remains: what would have happened had the
NCAA and its member schools taken a different road? For example,
suppose they had decided to withdraw from management of
intercollegiate contests and focus solely on intramural or interclass
games, just as McCracken wanted. Suppose they had continued
intercollegiate athletics, but rejected lucrative corporate deals that go
along with it. Or suppose they had limited game schedules by both
distance and number of games, and rejected postseason play? Could
they have done this? The theoretical answer is yes. The practical
answer is more difficult to provide. Although some institutions did
pull back, presidents were under a great deal of pressure to support
the growth of intercollegiate athletics or at least tolerate it.
Had they been able to withdraw completely, or even
significantly, it is clear that private enterprise would have filled that
gap in the form of minor league programs.342 Intercollegiate athletics
would still have existed, but likely on a more modest and much less
highly commercialized level. Indeed, it seems that the reason that
baseball could develop its own minor league, despite a college game,
was precisely because, in contrast to basketball and football, baseball
was well established professionally and in the public’s mind before the
time the college game came around.
Would the McCracken model or a toned-down amateur model
for “big time” athletics have really been so bad? While some might
argue that without athletics, institutions would have lost out on
lucrative financial opportunities, the truth is that they would also
have lost out on crippling athletic expenses and troubling ethical
dilemmas, as well. Coaches’ salaries, equipment and insurance costs,
and new stadiums are among the items that would likely not have
such high price tags. Conflicts of interest between school and student
athlete also would have been lessened, as would public pressure to
look aside as academic standards were jeopardized in favor of athletic
success. It might even be argued that without the commercial

342.
The Knight Commission has called upon the NBA and NFL to form professional
minor leagues. Id. The idea proffered is that persons uninterested in study could pursue
those options. Id.
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pressures presented by the current model, institutions would provide
a better education to their student-athletes.
What of the so-called advertising and financial benefits of the
game? Recent studies confirm the doubts James Angell expressed in
1918 about the so-called advertising value of athletics. They show
that big athletic programs do not translate into higher yields for nonathletic programs at the same institution or an increase in the quality
of the student body.343 One could imagine that schools could require
that a significant percentage of any targeted athletic gift and all
athletics income go into a non-athletically-related general fund, but
they have not done so. At most, they have gently encouraged athletic
donors to support other programs. It could be argued that if students
are selecting institutions solely because of their athletics programs,
perhaps such an advertising benefit is not well deserved anyway.
Finally, the suggestion that team spirit requires commercialism is
contrary to the traditional amateurist’s argument that commercialism
would undercut team spirit.
Chancellor McCracken, and others who supported him in
calling that December 1905 meeting, were bold, but they were also
naive. They believed that educators could take over intercollegiate
athletics and restore them to a higher moral plane. They believed
educators would do this because educators themselves stood on a
higher moral plane. Educators had a higher calling than mere
financial gain; educators celebrated learning and would insist that it
be central to any enterprise their institutions undertook. But the
educators who gathered in New York City that winter were merely
men. In the midst of pressure from students, alumni, and the public—
under the heat of the media’s glare—some fled to the ivory tower.
Others sold their caps and gowns to the highest bidder. Only a
courageous few remained, and still remain, to fight.
History reveals that the hopes and dreams of these founders
were greater than the will of the educators who engendered their
343.
Indeed, independent studies commissioned by the NCAA demonstrate that
schools that increase their athletic programs end up with reductions in their general
budgets. See generally Johnathan M. Orszag and Peter R. Orszag, The Empirical Effects of
Collegiate Athletics: An Interim Report (2003), available at http://www.ncaa.org/library
/research/athletic_spending/2003/empirical_effects_of_collegiate_athletics_interim_report.p
df; Johnathan M. Orszag and Peter R. Orszag, The Physical Capital Stock Used in
Collegiate Athletics (2005), available at http://www.ncaa.org/library/research/
athletic_spending/2005/physical_capital_stock_used_in_collegiate_athletics.pdf. The same
view is taken in a Knight Commission Study. See generally Robert H. Frank, Challenging
the Myth: A Review of the Links Between College Athletic Success, Student Quality, and
Donations (2004), http://www.knightcommission.org/about/frank_report/.
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faith. The first twenty-five years of the NCAA was an age of
controversy. The first twenty five years of the NCAA was an age of
patriotism. And, because the founders truly believed that most
educators would stand down and choose education over
commercialism, the first twenty-five years of the NCAA was also an
age of innocence.

